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COMPARATIVE FAULT AND THE INSOLVENT
DEFENDANT: A CRITIQUE AND
AMPLIFICATION OF AMERICAN
MOTORCYCLE ASSOCIATION v.
SUPERIOR COURT
By
Harry N Zavos*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines problems suggested by American Motorcycle
Association v. Superior Court1 that are associated with an insolvent defendant in multiple party litigation, within the context of California's
system of comparative negligence and partial equitable indemnity
based on comparative fault. It takes the position that California's formulation of comparative negligence, absent overriding considerations,
requires that the insolvent defendant's share of a loss be borne by all of
the remaining parties in direct ratio to their comparative fault, regardless of whether they are plaintiff or defendant.
Sections II through IV provide background and an analysis of the
problems posed by the doctrines of comparative fault and joint and
several liability. Section V examines, critiques, and finds wanting the
considerations proffered by the California Supreme Court in support of
its holding that the risk of the insolvent defendant must be borne solely
by the remaining solvent defendants. The supreme court's major contention that a party's status as plaintiff or defendant results from a fundamental difference in the character of the negligent conduct is
examined and rejected. Section VI examines and critiques the appellate court's considerations in support of its holding that the risk of the
insolvent defendant should fall solely on the plaintiff. The appellate
court's emphasis on the need to protect the social fund is examined in
detail.
Sections VII and VIII deal with an amplification of the theory of
partial equitable indemnity which may include a culpable plaintiff.
They set out an approach to deal with those situations in which parties
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
1. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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pay more than their proportionate share of a judgment. Section VII

indicates how the rights and liabilities of all the parties should be affected each time such a party is able to recover against any other party.
Section VIII outlines a practical manner in which the theory developed

in Section VII might be implemented.
II.

BACKGROUND

In Li v. Yellow Cab Co. , the California Supreme Court rejected
the traditional "all or nothing"3 defense of contributory negligence. In

so doing, the court caused tort law to veer in courses previously uncharted by the state's legal system. In place of the "harsh ' 4 and "inequitable"5 "all or nothing" defense, the court established the principle

that "liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence
caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault."6 This new doc-

trine did not spring forth as did Athena from the head of Zeus, fully
clothed in armour and unanswerable to higher authority-not fully

armoured, because the court recognized that the adoption of the new
principle of comparative fault involved numerous problem areas to be
addressed by future cases; 7 not immune to higher authority, because

the court recognized that comparative negligence was mandated by
2. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
3. Id. at 810-11, 812-13, 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1230-31, 1232, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 86263, 864, 875.
4. Id. at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The original formulation was
worded in terms of liability for damages "borne by those whose negligence caused it in
direct proportion to the extent of their causal responsibility." Id. at 812-13 n.6a, 532 P.2d at
1232 n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.6a. The court then substituted the words "respective
fault" for "causal responsibility" and indicated that by the use of "fault" the court meant
nothing more than "negligence" in the accepted legal sense. Id. The court thus seemed to
focus on the relative negligent character of the conduct, rather than on its relative causative
contribution. See Comment, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 938 (1968) (part of a symposium on comparative negligence). In Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978), the court sought to blend the new principle of comparative negligence with
claims involving strict liability for products. It recognized that "fault" should include acts or
omissions that subject a person to strict tort liability, id. at 741-42, 575 P.2d at 1171-72, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 389-90, and that the principle might be better described as "equitable apportionment of loss" rather than as comparative fault or negligence. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at
1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390. In this article, the word "negligence" applies equally to Dalytype situations where "fault" presumes liability predicated on strict liability as well as to
ordinary negligence. And, to the extent that the supreme court applies comparative fault to
wilful conduct, "negligence" as used in this article is intended to cover such conduct. See
infra note 106.
7. 13 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice."
One of the questions left unanswered by the court in Li is whether
the traditional common law doctrine of joint and several liability is to
remain unaffected by comparative fault. Under this doctrine, if two or
more negligent defendants, acting either independently or jointly, are
the proximate cause of an indivisible injury, each defendant is liable to
the plaintiff for the entire injury. 9 The basis for joint and several liability is the absence of any logical basis for apportioning loss.' 0 With the
advent of Li, a specific percentage figure could be found which would
represent the proportion of fault of each of the parties causing an injury. Not only could this figure serve as a logical basis for apportioning
the loss among the parties, but the court's formulation of the "pure"
comparative standard suggested that in multiple party litigation a defendant should have his liability limited in direct proportion to his negligence. The court concluded:
[Tihe "all-or-nothing" rule of contributory negligence as it
presently exists in this state should be and is herewith superseded by a system of "pure" comparative negligence, the fundamental purpose of which shall be to assign responsibility.
and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of
negligence of each of the parties."
Some California courts did not see in Li any basis for altering the
8. Id. at 810-13, 532 P.2d at 1230-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862-64. Without distorting the
court's opinion, it could be added that the greatest of these factors is "fundamental justice."
A fair reading of Li is consistent with the statement that the major precept guiding the court
was that of fairness or justice. The pervasiveness of that fundamental precept is evident in
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
There the court held that plaintiff's negligent conduct could diminish recovery against a
defendant whose liability was founded on strict liability. Faced with the conceptual difficulty of comparing conduct based on fault with liability not based on fault, the court stated
that "[flixed semantic consistency. . . is less important than the attainment of a just and
equitable result." Id. at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. In fact, the court
characterized the Li principle as an equitable one when it suggested that the principle might
be best described as "equitable apportionment of loss" rather than as comparative fault or
negligence. Id. at 736-37, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. The court also
characterized the holding in Li as announcing the principle that "loss should be assessed
equitably in proportion to fault." Id. Finally, the court, in extending the principle of Li to
strict liability cases, spoke in terms of "logic, justice and fundamental fairness" and indicated that "[t]he law consistently seeks to elevate justice and equity above the exact contours
of a mathematical equation." Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
9. Apodaca v. Haworth, 206 Cal. App. 2d 209, 213, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463 (1962).
10. Id., 23 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64; Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34,
218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950).
11. 13 Cal. 3d at 829-30, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875; see also id. at 810-13,
532 P.2d at 1230-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862-64.
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traditional doctrine of joint and several liability. 2 Other courts, including some trial courts and one court of appeal, 13 concluded that the
court's formulation of comparative negligence in Li meant that judgment against each of several defendants was limited to the percentage
of the damages assigned to each defendant. 14 In effect, these courts
viewed Li as eliminating joint and several liability in a multiparty setting and, in its place, instituting several liability based on the extent of
each party's fault. Thus, if plaintiff A, who suffered a $100,000 loss,
were herself 30% negligent, and defendant B were 10% negligent, and
defendant C, 60% negligent, then the plaintiff could only get a $10,000
judgment against defendant B and a $60,000 judgment against
defendant C. The Second Appellate District, Division One, gave exof the law in American Motorcycle Assopression to this understanding
5
ciation v. Superior Court.
The posture of American Motorcycle as it reached the appellate
court was as follows:
1. Plaintiff had sued several defendants in connection with injuries suffered in a motorcycle event.
2. Defendant American Motorcycle Association (AMA) answered, denying plaintiff's allegations and raising certain affirmative
defenses, including a claim that plaintiff's own negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.
3. AMA sought to file a cross-complaint against plaintiff's parents, seeking (a) indemnity from plaintiff's parents if AMA were found
liable; and (b) a declaration of relative negligence, so that any award
by the percentage of damages allocable
against AMA might be reduced
6
to the parents' negligence.1
4. The trial court denied AMA's motion to fie the cross-complaint. The matter was then brought before the appellate court on a
writ of mandate to order the trial court to vacate its order, and to enter
a new order allowing the cross-complaint to be filed.
The appellate court granted relief by allowing the cross-complaint,
12. See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Ct., 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976).

13. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977), vacated, 20
Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
14. See Comment, Comparative Fault-Three Years After Li, 12 CENTER FOR CAL.
JUDGES, JuD. ED. & RESEARCH J., § 18 at p. C-137 (Spring 1978).
15. 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977), vacated, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182

(1978).
16. fd. at 499-500. In the first cause of action, AMA sought to shift the entire loss to the
parents. In the second cause of action, AMA sought to bring in the parents to reduce AMA's
potential share of the damage in the event that there was several liability.

19811

COMPAR

TIVE FA ULT

including the cause of action founded on the proposition of several liability. In so doing, the court explicitly affirmed several liability. The
court justified rejection of joint and several liability in two ways. First,
the court indicated that the foundation of the doctrine had been eliminated by Li.17 Second, the court propounded positive arguments for its
elimination based on the language of Li and on the social costs of retaining joint and several liability.18
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The
supreme court held that (1) Li did not require any modification of the
doctrine of joint and several liability among independent concurrent
tortfeasors; (2) Li required that partial equitable indemnity be available to defendants so that any joint tortfeasor who paid more than his
share of a judgment could obtain partial indemnity from fellow defendants based on comparative fault; and (3) AMA could file a crosscomplaint in order to seek such indemnity.19
Justice Clark, dissenting, stated that the majority of the court, by
retaining joint and several liability, had rejected the Li principle. He
made his point by using an example involving a 30% at fault plaintiff,
A, a 10% at fault solvent defendant, B, and a 60% at fault insolvent20
defendant, C. Under the majority opinion, A could recover the entire
damage from B, reduced only by,'s proportion of negligence-that is,
A, could recover 70% of the damages from a 10% at fault defendant. 2 '
The majority did not deny Justice Clark's figures. Instead, it relied
upon three rationales to indicate that the joint and several liability concept is not inconsistent with the doctrine announced in Li.
This article examines the majority's rationales, as well as those of
the lower court in support of several liability, and compares them with
the wellspring of the Li principle of comparative fault-logic, practical
experience, and fundamental justice. This examination shows that Li
demands a rejection of the solution of both courts and requires a solu22
tion similar to that suggested by Justice Clark and Professor Fleming,
a solution in which the risk of the insolvent defendant is borne by all
17. Id. at 500.
18. Id. at 500-03.
19. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 582-84, 578 P.2d 899,
901-02, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184-85 (1978).
20. The word "insolvent" in this article is not used in any technical sense. It merely
refers to a judgment debtor whose available assets are insufficient to satisfy the judgment.
21. 20 Cal. 3d at 609, 578 P.2d at 919, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 202 (Clark, J., dissenting).
22. See Fleming, Reportto the Joint Committee ofthe CaliforniaLegislature on Tort Liability on the ProblemsAssociatedwith American MotorcycleAssociation v. Superior Court, 30
HASTINGS W. 1465, 1466, 1494-98 (1979).
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the parties, including the plaintiff, in direct proportion to their relative
fault.
Once the proposition that the risk of the insolvent defendant
should be borne by all the parties legally responsible for the injury is
accepted, questions remain as to how that insolvency should be distributed among the parties and what rights and liabilities should be created
as a result of that distribution. These general questions are addressed
in Sections VII and VIII of this article.
III. THE PROBLEM
If all defendants are financially viable and accessible, the Li principle is easily satisfied regardless of whether liability is several, as the
lower court held, or joint and several, as the supreme court held.
Following Justice Clark's example, let us assume that A is a 30% at
fault plaintiff who suffers a loss of $100,000; B, a 10% at fault defendant; and C, a 60% at fault defendant. The loss resulting from the combined fault of A, B, and C is initially borne by A. Under the lower
court's decision, A could shift part of the loss by recovering 10% from B
and 60% from C. If B and C are financially solvent and accessible to
A, each of the three parties would ultimately bear the loss in direct
proportion to his respective fault. A would receive $70,000 from B and
C, relieving him of all but 30% of the loss that he initially suffered. B
would pay $10,000 and C the remaining $60,000. Under the supreme
court's view of joint and several liability, A, who initially bore 100% of
the loss, could recover 70% from either B or C. Assuming both B and
C are solvent,A could collect $70,000 from B. At that point, A bears a
loss in direct proportion to his negligence, but B bears 70% of the loss
although he is only 10% at fault. Given the court's announced doctrine
of partial equitable indemnity and C's financial viability, B can then
recover $60,000 from C. Ultimately, the parties bear the loss in direct
proportion to their respective fault. In either case, the parties arrive at
the same destination, albeit by different routes.
The problem arises when one of the parties, C, for example, is
insolvent.'3 Under these circumstances, both the lower court's solution
23. This article focuses on the problem of a defendant in a multiparty litigation who is
not answerable in damages due to ostensible insolvency. See supra note 20. It also covers
those situations where an at fault party is not answerable in damages because he was not
named in the suit by the plaintiff nor was he brought in by any of the defendants. However,
a defendant may also be unanswerable to pay that part of the loss corresponding to his
proportionate fault for other reasons. For example, he could be unavailable to answer in
damages because of a prior settlement with the plaintiff in which the settlement figure was
less than his proportionate share of the judgment. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146
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of several liability and the high court's solution of joint and several
liability are contrary to the proposition that liability for damages
should be borne by the parties in direct proportion to their respective
fault. The courts differ only as to who should bear the disproportionate
share, i.e., the burden of C's insolvency. With the lower court's "several liability," A initially bears 100% of the loss and can only be reimbursed by B for $10,000, leaving $60,000 unsatisfied and borne byA in
excess ofA's proportionate fault. Under the supreme court's "joint and
several liability," 4 initially bears 100% of the loss and can recover
$70,000 from B. A bears a loss in direct proportion to his negligence,
but B bears $70,000 of loss, $60,000 in excess of the amount attributable to his 10% proportionate share of fault.
In one sense, if any one defendant is insolvent, the Li principle
cannot apply to all the remaining parties because a portion of the damage attributable to the insolvent defendant's fault would have to be
borne by someone else. The lower court would insure that a defendant's liability would not exceed his proportionate fault, placing the burden on the plaintiff; the supreme court's soluti6n would favor the
plaintiff at the expense of the solvent defendant.
A third alternative suggested by Professor Fleming24 and endorsed
by Justice Clark25 would have the negligent plaintiff2 6 and a solvent
defendant bear the $60,000 loss according to the Li principle-in direct
proportion to their respective fault. In this way, plaintiff and defendant
would be treated evenhandedly as to the unrecoverable $60,000. Such
a solution mirrors the primal concept that in a system where liability is
based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability
or loss.2 Since C cannot be made to answer for the portion of damage
attributable to his fault, the total loss of $100,000 remains to be borne
by the 30% at fault plaintiff, A, and the 10% at fault defendant, B.
Under the Li principle, the total loss should be borne in direct proporCal. Rptr. at 198. Furthermore, in a workers' compensation setting, if one of the parties at
fault was an employer, that employer's liability would be determined by the worker's compensation award. If the award was less than his proportionate share of the judgment under
comparative negligence principles, he would be unavailable for the difference. See CAL.
LABOR CODE §§ 3601(a), 3864 (West 1971 & Supp. 1981); Arbaugh v. Proctor & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978); E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Ct., 56
Cal. App. 3d 650, 128 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976). This article does not deal with such situations.
24. Fleming, Foreword-ComparativeNegligence at Last-By JudicialChoice, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 239, 251-52, 267-68 (1976).
25. 20 Cal. 3d at 614, 578 P.2d at 922, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Clark, J., dissenting).
26. Fleming and Justice Clark would retain joint and several liability when the plaintiff
was without fault, a position consistent with the thesis developed in this article.
27. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
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tion to A's and B's relative fault-that is, in a 3 to 1 ratio (30% to 10%),
with plaintiff absorbing $75,000 of the loss and defendant B absorbing
$25,000 of the loss.28
The result is the same if A and B absorb their share of the
$100,000 loss attributable to their respective fault ($30,000 for A and
$10,000 for B)29 and, on a ratio of 3 to 1, absorb the $60,000 portion of
the loss attributable to the insolvent defendant, C ($45,000 by A and
$15,000 by B).10 This method of calculation is useful when C is partially solvent and is able to respond in damages for a portion, but not
for all, of his share of the loss. It is also more in keeping with the
conceptual formulation of the comparative fault principle: A and B
each absorb the loss attributable to their respective fault and between
them they share the amount attributable to the insolvent defendant
based on a ratio of their fault.
This solution might be viewed as a modified form of joint and
several liability coupled with the supreme court's doctrine of partial
equitable indemnity. It is modified because plaintiff, when at fault,
would be considered, for purposes of joint and several liability, as a
concurrent joint tortfeasor along with the defendants. Thus, in our example, A, B, and C are concurrent tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the entire loss of $100,000. 3 1 A, as plaintiff, initially has borne
the loss in excess of his proportional share while the concurrent
tortfeasors B and C have not borne any loss. Therefore, on the basis of
the supreme court's principle of partial equitable indemnity, A should
be compensated by his fellow tortfeasors based on their comparative
fault. This would appear to be the solution required by the Li principle
28. In effect, when C is totally insolvent, one could ignore C for the purposes of fixing
the proportion of loss to be borne by other parties whose fault is causally implicated in the
loss. That is, while C may be 60% at fault, his insolvency would result in his acts being
treated as an act of God. The total fault then would be allocated betweenA and B. SinceA
was 30% at fault and B 10%, the ratio of comparative fault between the two is 3:1. The
entire $100,000 amount would then be divided according to this ratio. As a result,, Awould
absorb $75,000 of the loss and B $25,000.
29. These damages may be termedA's and B's "culpable damages." See infra text accompanying notes 54-98.
30. These damages may be termedA's and B's "innocent damages." See infra text accompanying notes 54-98.
31. To refer to a plaintiff as a "concurrent tortfeasor jointly and severally liable for the
entire loss along with other defendants" is obviously an artificial use of the language, for
what sense does it make to say that-4 is jointly and severally liable for the loss? To whom is
plaintiff liable? To himself? Obviously, what is meant by saying that plaintiff could be
viewed as a concurrent tortfeasor jointly and severally liable with B and C for the loss is that
4 is as legally responsible for the loss as are B and C-that 4 is as much a proximate cause
of the loss as are B and C, and must share in the loss in the same way as do B and C.
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unless those midwives of Li-logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice-require that the law favor either plaintiffs or defendants. The supreme court, however, offered several rationales to justify
favoring plaintiffs at the expense of defendants and refused to apply the
Li principle to that portion of loss attributable to an insolvent defendant; the lower court, in contrast, favored defendants over plaintiffs.
Before the adequacy of those rationales can be evaluated, an exposition
of the joint and several liability concept is required.
IV.

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

The term "joint and several liability," as commentators have
pointed out, has had a variety of meanings depending upon the contexts in which it has been used.32 Its early history is embedded in the
notion of "joint" tortfeasors. 33 Since each joint tortfeasor was responsible for the other's tort, his liability to the plaintiff was considered joint
and several. Some commentators point out that historically there was
confusion between the procedural and substantive aspects of "joint
torts" or "joint tortfeasors. 34
Procedurally, the question of whether a tort was joint determined
whether the plaintiff could sue two or more defendants in the same
action.35 Substantively, defendants whose tort was joint could each be
liable to a plaintiff for the entire injury.36 Joint torts occurred when the
tort of one defendant was a tort of the other. Such joint torts have been
roughly classified into three categories: (1) where defendants acted in
concert or from a common design;37 (2) where the tortious conduct of
one (for example, a servant) was vicariously attributed to another (for
32. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, 692-714 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
HARPER & JAMES]; Prosser, Joint Torts and SeveralLiability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937)

[hereinafter cited as Prosser]; Comment, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REv.
399, 403-04 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Joint Torts]; Comment, Recent Developments in Joint
& Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1319, 1319-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Recent
Developments].
33. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 414-18.
34. See, e.g., 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 694-97; JointTorts, supra note 32, at
404.
35. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 595-97; Prosser, supra note 32, at 414-18.
36. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 595-97; Prosser, supra note 32, at 418-21.
37. Where two individuals acted in concert by a common design, causing injury, the act
of one became the act of both as far as the law was concerned. Indeed, where there was
agreement, the acts of one would become the acts of the other even if the other did not act at
all. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co. v. Superior Ct., 43 Cal. 2d 815, 827, 270 P.2d 35, 42-43
(1955); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 876, Comment on clause (a) (1939) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
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example, the master);38 and (3) where two defendants breached a common duty.39 Joint tortfeasors were each liable for the entire injury because one was held responsible for the tortious conduct of the otherthe tortfeasors shared the same tortious conduct. Since there was an
identity of tortious conduct or of duty breached, the rigid rules of procedural joinder were relaxed, and all the tortfeasors could be joined in

one action.
Two or more individuals' liability for the entire injury, however,
did not necessarily make them joint tortfeasors who could be joined in
one action.40 Courts early recognized that entire liability for a given
injury may be traceable to the tortious conduct of two or more defend-

ants even when the tort was not "joint." They recognized that the tortious conduct of a defendant, separate and distinct from that of

another, might combine with another's tortious conduct to proximately
cause injury to a plaintiff.41 In such an instance, the tort would not be
"joint," because the conduct of each defendant was independent of the
other.42 The first party was not able to insulate himself from liability
38. The very statement of the principle of vicarious liability is a statement that the act
giving rise to liability is coextensive and indistinguishable as between employee and employer or agent and principal. Agents or servants are held liable for their tortious acts; the
principal or master is not held liable for his own act, but only for the act of his agent or
servant. The acts of the agent or servant vis-a-vis the plaintiff are made the acts of the
principal or master for the purposes of liability to the plaintiff.
39. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 429-31; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 692-94,
697-702; Recent Developments, supra note 32, at 1319. Harper and James indicate that the
concert-of-action and breach-of-duty situations are examples of the conduct of one becoming the conduct of another. I HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 692. In the concert-ofaction situation, the conduct of one defendant becomes the conduct of the other regardless
of whether the other acts. In the breach of a common duty situation, however, there is
obviously conduct by two individuals--for example, failure to maintain a common wall
which, as a result, collapses and injures plaintiff. In this latter situation, both defendants act
or ffiil to act and do so independently of one another; however, that action or inaction is
identical or coextensive vis-a-vis the plaintiff's injury, thereby providing the unity to make
the tort a joint tort. In the common duty situation, the defendants' breaches of the common
duty are indistinguishable. Thus, in Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 P. 707 (1899), two sets
of defendants were under the same duty to maintain a street. Both breached that duty,
causing plaintiffs injury. While the court recognized that joinder, the procedural aspect of
joint and several liability, required concert of action, it nevertheless allowed joinder in this
case in the absence of such concerted action. In doing so, the court stated that joinder would
be allowed when the concurrent negligence of the parties causing an injury occurred "at one
and the same time." Id. at 218, 58 P. at 708. The concurrent negligence of the parties was
coextensive and indistinguishable.
40. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 692-93; Prosser, supra note 32, at 414-15.
41. See, e.g., Lacy v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 97, 98-99,29 P.2d 781,782 (1934);
Carrol v. Central Counties Gas Co., 74 Cal. App. 303, 308, 240 P. 53, 55 (1925).
42. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 693. Such defendants were called "independent concurrent tortfeasors."
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by referring to the second party's conduct.4 3 In other words, if the nature of two defendants' conduct was such that in legal effect they were
both the proximate cause of the injury, the fact that their actions concurred to proximately cause that injury did not relieve either of liability
for the entire damage.
In such a case, the source of liability for each of the defendants is
not based on an identity of the tortious conduct, nor is it based on the
breach of an identical duty. Each defendant's tort is his own and the
duty breached by one defendant is not identical to that of the other.
Liability for the entire injury rests on the principle that each defendant
is liable for all of the injury proximately caused by his tortious conduct,
even though other factors, innocent or culpable, may have causally
combined with that conduct to bring about plaintiff's loss.4 An obvious requisite for holding each of two or more such defendants liable for
the entire injury is that the injury be indivisible-that is, the harm cannot be apportioned by reference to the causative contribution of the
defendants.45 If the injury could be apportioned among two or more
defendants based upon their causal contribution, then to hold them
each liable for the entire injury would amount to holding both liable
for more damage than was proximately caused by each.
Thus, liability of two or more individuals for the same injury arose
from two different sources. The first was based on the individuals being joint tortfeasors; this in turn depended on whether there was a unity
of plaintiff's cause of action against each.' The second source was
based on a radically different principle in which there was no coextensiveness or identity of action on the part of the defendants; the acts of
one defendant were not made the acts of the other. In its early evolution, the concept of joint tortfeasors was reserved for those situations
where the conduct of one could be made the conduct of the other, and
was not based on substantive liability for the entire injury. Later, joint
liability for the entire injury became synonymous with being a "joint
tortfeasor."47
Urland v. French, 141 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 296 P.2d 568, 572 (1956).
Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 503-05, 111 P. 534, 536-37
Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87, 90 (1874).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1976) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, at § 879.
46. Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 15 P.2d 876, 878 (1944); Butler v. Ashworth,
110 Cal. 614, 618-19, 43 P. 4, 5 (1895); Alexander v. Hammarberg, 103 Cal. App. 2d 872,
879, 230 P.2d 399, 404 (1951).
47. Compare Butler v. Ashworth, 110 Cal. 614, 620, 43 P. 4, 5 (1895) with Watson v.
McEwen, 225 Cal. App. 2d 771, 775, 37 Cal. Rptr. 677, 680 (1964); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v.
Consani, 223 Cal. App. 2d 342, 346, 35 Cal. Rptr. 750, 752 (1963); Apodaca v. Haworth, 206
43.
44.
(1910);
45.
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In American Motorcycle, the California Supreme Court confined
its holding on joint and several liability to those circumstances where
the defendants were independent concurrent tortfeasors. 41 This article
explores the relationship of comparative negligence to joint and several
liability within that same narrow scope. The discussion developed
herein is not necessarily applicable to joint tortfeasors where there is an
identity or coextensiveness of the acts or duties giving rise to their
liability.

49

V.

THE SUPREME COURT RATIONALE

The majority articulated four arguments supporting the retention
ofjoint and several liability: (a) other jurisdictions which have adopted
comparative negligence have retained joint and several liability;
(b) while fault can be apportioned, the injury remains indivisible, and
the defendants' negligent conduct is the proximate cause of that indivisible injury; (c) joint and several liability is necessary to serve the
policy of making the plaintiff whole; and (d) elimination of joint and
several liability would be unfair to innocent plaintiffs, and, even when
plaintiffs are at fault, the character of their fault warrants preferring
them over defendants when allocating the risk of an insolvent
defendant.
Cal. App. 2d 209, 213-14, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461, 463-64 (1962); Holahan v. McGrew, Ill Cal.
App. 443, 446, 295 P. 1059, 1060 (1931). In the latter cases, the court blurred the distinction
between independent concurrent tortfeasors and joint tortfeasors, describing both as joint
tortfeasors. Butsee Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 150 P.2d 876, 878 (1944); Week v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 104 Cal. App. 2d 599, 612, 232 P.2d 293, 300
(195 1); Alexander v. Hammarberg, 103 Cal. App. 2d 872, 879, 230 P.2d 399, 404 (1951). In
these cases, liability for the entire injury did not render defendants "joint tortfeasors." According to these decisions, the 'Joint tortfeasors" classification requires a unity of the cause
of action.
48. 20 Cal. 3d at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
49. For example, assume that a plaintiff is injured as a result of the negligence of an
employee acting within the scope of his employment. Furthermore, assume that plaintiff
obtains a joint judgment against the employee and employer. The judgment against the
employer reflects the fact that the employer was held vicariously liable for the conduct of his
employee. In that instance, it makes little sense to talk about apportioning fault between
employee and employer. The employer has breached no duty. His liability to plaintiff stems
from the fact that the law fastens upon him the consequences of his employee's breach of
duty. If the plaintiff collected the entire judgment from the employer it would be difficult to
see how the court's doctrine of partial equitable indemnity based on proportionate fault
would be a basis for the employer to recover only part of the paid judgment from his employee. In that instance, the original notion of equitable indemnity which would shift the
entire loss from one party to the other would be more appropriate.
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.4. Other Jurisdictions'Treatment of Joint andSeveral Liability
The court, by way of a vindicating patina, points out that other
state courts have retained joint and several liability after the adoption
of comparative fault.5 0 Justice Clark argues that of the four jurisdictions (Mississippi, New York, Wisconsin, and Georgia) cited by the
majority, only one, Georgia, is on point. 1 And, even in Georgia, the
statutory provision does not allow joint and several liability when the
injury involved is one to property. 2
One major distinction between the four jurisdictions and California not mentioned in the opinion is that, in the other jurisdictions, the
courts were responding to a legislative abolition of the contributory
negligence defense.13 The courts did not abandon that defense and alter tort law by rallying around the standard of logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice. These jurisdictions were not committed
to working out problem areas related to comparative fault in terms of
that standard. Indeed, an examination of the decisions cited by the
majority reveals little, if any, rationale other than "we see no reason to
change." This "inertia" rationale can hardly give support to a court
that, in Li, overcame the inertia of legal tradition dating back to the
beginning of California law to lurch forward in new directions, guided
by the principles of logic and fundamental justice. It cannot provide a
justificatory patina for a court that, again in Li, indicated that problems
attendant to the new system of comparative fault should be worked out
in a manner consistent with those guiding principles.
B. Indivisibility of Injury
Defendant AMA relied on Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co.54 to argue
that Li required abandonment of joint and several liability as to concurrent tortfeasors. It argued that, in Finnegan, concurrent tortfeasors
were held jointly and severally liable because (1) there existed no basis
for dividing damages and (2) the law was loath to permit an innocent
plaintiff to suffer as against a wrongdoing defendant.5 5 AMA argued
that plaintiffs no longer need be innocent to recover and that apportioned fault under the Li principle could serve as a basis for dividing
20 Cal.3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
Id at 613, 578 P.2d at 922, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 348, 9 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1940).
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (Supp. 1980-81).
54. 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950).
55. Id. at 434-35, 218 P.2d at 32.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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damages. 6
One of the arguments that the court relied on in rejecting the contention that the "fault figure" sanctioned by Li could be used to apportion damages was predicated on the "indivisibility" of the injury.57 The
court correctly stated that the rationale underlying joint and several
liability among concurrent tortfeasors Was that each of the tortfeasors
was proximately liable for all the damage he or she caused as long as
that damage was single or indivisible.5 8 From this point the majority
reasoned that, although Li provided for apportionment offault among
the parties, this was not tantamount to apportioning the injury.5 9 The
court seemed to draw a clear distinction between fault which could be
apportioned and the damages resulting from the fault which remain
indivisible.
At first blush, the court's statement of indivisibility of the injury
appears as an independent ground against apportioning liability. The
court never discusses what renders an injury "divisible" or "indivisible." Indeed, once "indivisibility of the injury" is analyzed, the court's
point evaporates and becomes a mere restatement of its conclusion.60
The illusory or tautological character of the court's argument is clear
when one remembers that most actions in tort are at law for money
damages. Consequently, regardless of the injury's character, for the
purposes of a lawsuit the injury will be expressed in quantitative
56. 20 Cal. 3d at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188. Of course, as the court
points out, the possibility of a culpable plaintiff does not mean that in all cases the plaintiff
will be culpable. Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188. In those cases where the
plaintiff is not culpable, the AMA argument is undercut. In instances where one of the two
defendants is judgment-proof, AMA's position of several liability would have the law favor
a solvent wrongdoer over an innocent plaintiff.
57. Id. at 588-89, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
58. Id. at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
59. Id.
60. The argument is like the story of the child who asked his father why homing pigeons
always fly home. The father responded by saying that they flew home because they had a
homing instinct. On the surface, the response seemed to indicate something new regarding
the homing behavior of pigeons. However, when the child pressed the father as to what a
homing instinct was, the father replied, "the ability to always fly home." What appeared as
an independent ground for explaining the pigeons' homing behavior turned out, upon analysis, to be merely a restatement of the behavior. This is an example of an analytic statement
being passed off as a material or synthetic statement. For a discussion of this notion, see J.
RAY & H. ZAVOS, Reasoning and Argument: Deduction and Induction, and Reasoning and
Argument: Some Special Problems and Types, PERSPECTIVES OF ARGUMENTATION 55-58,
88-93 (Miller & Nilsen eds. 1966). In this case, the court is offering the statement as an
independent reason justifying its thesis; in the homing pigeon example, the analytic statement is offered as an independent cause explaining given behavior. For a discussion of the
distinction, see id. at 51-52.
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terms-in dollars and cents. 6 ' Once the injury or damage is expressed
in quantitative terms, it certainly is divisible. In fact, the court's application of the principle of comparative negligence to the plaintiff in
American Motorcycle involved an actual dividing or apportioning of
damages vis-a-vis that plaintiff.6" According to the court, the damages,
no matter what their source, as expressed in dollars and cents, should
be divided according to the proportionate fault of the plaintiff vis-a-vis
all other culpable individuals and the judgment reduced by that
amount. When it came to the court's formulation of partial equitable
indemnity among defendants, the court continued to insist on the indivisibility of the injury but nevertheless provided for division or apportionment of the damages among the defendants in proportion to their
degree of fault.63
It is clear that "divisibility of the injury," once the injury is expressed in quantitative terms, is not a matter of impossibility; rather, it
is a matter of the availability of some logical or equitable basis of apportionment vis-a-vis the causative conduct of the parties who are at
fault. Consequently, the majority's statement, that joint and several liability must be retained and damages cannot be apportioned merely by
characterizing the injury as "indivisible," is an assertion, and not an
argument. To say that the injury is indivisible is not a descriptive statement of impossibility of division; rather, it is a restatement of the conclusion that the damages expressed in quantitative terms will not be
apportioned according to proportionate fault. The majority merely asserts that "a defendant has no equitable claim vis-a-vis an injured
plaintiff to be relieved of liability for damages which he has proximately caused simply because some other tortfeasor's negligence may
also have caused the same harm." 64
The court, by its decisions in Li andAmerican Motorcycle, denied
apportionment, between a negligent plaintiff and a solvent defendant,
of damages attributable to the fault of an insolvent defendant. But, by
these same decisions, the court: (1) under the doctrine of comparative
fault, allowed apportionment of the amount of damage attributable to
the proportionate negligence of a plaintiff; and (2) under its doctrine of
partial equitable indemnity, allowed apportionment among defendants
of their joint liability to plaintiff. The court never explains what equi61. See Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 566, 2 P.2d 790, 794 (1931).
62. 20 Cal. 3d at 589 n.2, 578 P.2d at 906 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189 n.2; see 13 Cal. 3d at
829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
63. 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
64. Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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table grounds mandating apportionment are present in the latter situations, but that are absent in the prior situation, precluding
apportionment of damages.65
Commentators who have written about joint and several liability
for an "indivisible" injury appear to agree that "indivisibility" is not
fixed metaphysically with regard to the character of a given injury.
Rather, they indicate that indivisibility flows from the absence of a reasonable, logical or equitable basis for apportioning damages among the
defendants.66 One court succinctly analyzed the problem when it
stated that entire liability in cases of concurrent negligence rests on the
fact that there is no "yardstick" with which to measure the two acts of
negligence, nor is there a "scale" with which to weigh them; thus, in the
absence of a logical basis for apportionment, all defendants are held
jointly and severally liable.6 7 Dean Prosser indicates that in general,
entire liability will be imposed only where there is no reasonable alternative.68 It has been suggested that, wherever some rational and possible.basis can be found, courts will apportion damages and that the
courts' predisposition might be due in part to the old common law rule
of lack of contribution among tortfeasors. 69 This concept of indivisibility of injury requires additional analysis if we are to understand the
logical insufficiency in the supreme court's rationale supporting the retention of an unaltered joint and several liability doctrine along with
comparative fault.
Cases of independent concurrent joint tortfeasors have been categorized into three classes where: (1) the conduct of each defendant
could account for the entire injury independent of the other defendants' conduct; (2) the conduct of any one defendant separate from the
concurrent conduct of the others would be incapable of causing any
injury; and (3) the conduct of each defendant could cause some of
plaintiff's injury but not all of it.70 Harper and James indicate that the
judicial trend is to apply joint and several liability to the entire injury
in the first two categories, but that in the latter category, no uniform
rule has been applied by the courts.71
65. Granted, such an attempt is made in the other two arguments of the majority opinion. They will be analyzed later in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 99-119.
66. Prosser, supra note 32, at 430, 442; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 701-02.
67. Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 276, 8 A.2d 201, 203 (1939).
68. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 52, at 313-14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF ToRTs].
69. Id. at 317-18.
70. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 702.
71. Id. at 702-09.
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Conceptually, the difference between the first two categories and
the last can be rationalized on the basis of necessary or sufficient legal
causes. If each defendant's conduct apart from the conduct of the other
defendants could cause the entire injury (first category), then his conduct is a sufficient, although not necessary, cause of the injury. If the
conduct of each of several defendants alone could not account for any
of the injury (second category), then each defendant's conduct is a necessary causal condition, although apart from the other defendants' conduct it is not a sufficient causal condition for plaintiff's injury. In both
instances the defendant's conduct is a cause, necessary or sufficient, of
the entire injury. If, however, the conduct of each causes a portion of
the injury but is not sufficient or necessary to cause the entire injury
(third category), then there is a portion of that injury for which each
defendant's conduct is not a causal condition. Thus, to hold a defendant in this last category liable for the entire injury would be tantamount
to holding him liable for a portion of the injury for which his conduct is
not causally implicated.
With respect to individual defendants whose conduct is a sufficient
but not a necessary cause of the injury (first category), additional arguments can be given for finding them jointly and severally liable. One
argument is that such a defendant, quite apart from the other defendants' conduct, is being held liable only for injury that would nevertheless be attributed to him. This argument merely restates the fact that
his conduct was a sufficient cause of plaintiff's injury. Furthermore,
commentators have stated that no rational basis exists for apportioning
damages between the two defendants. 7 2 Finally, in the event of an insolvent defendant, to apportion the damages between the defendants
on some ratio and make each severally liable for his portion would
leave an innocent plaintiff partially uncompensated for an injury in
which his conduct was not culpable. Equity and justice, therefore,
would dictate that when a culpable defendant's conduct is sufficient for
72. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 32, at 434. Given the Li principle of comparative fault,
it would be interesting to determine empirically what a jury would do with a classic case in
the category of independent concurrent tortfeasors, where two independent but simultaneous sources of loud noises are each sufficient alone to frighten an animal that in turn causes
injury. One would suspect that as between the two sources each would be held equally at
fault-at fault on a one-to-one basis. In fact, it would be interesting to reflect on whether
any other division could be justified. This question would depend on what is being compared between the two defendants: the degree to which each individual's conduct causally
contributed to the injury or the relative degree of negligence that characterizes the conduct?
The California courts have not squarely addressed the question of what is being compared
when the jury fixes comparative fault. For a brief discussion of the problem, see H. WooDs,
COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 5:5 (1978). See also supra note 6.
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the entire injury, an innocent plaintiff should not run the risk of being
only partially compensated-a possible result should such a defendant
be held only severally liable for a portion of the injury.
When the conduct of each of several defendants would by itself be
incapable of causing any injury (second category), then, in the absence
of comparative negligence, there is obviously no rational basis for apportioning the damages among them. The traditional tort remedy is to
restore plaintiff to the position he would have been in had he not been
injured by the culpable conduct of the defendants.73 Since, absent the
culpable conduct of any one defendant, the plaintiff would not have
suffered the injury, each such defendant should be liable for the entire
damage.
In the situation where each defendant's conduct would have
caused some, but not all, of the injury (third category), a given defendant's conduct is not causally implicated in some portion of the damage.
Consequently, if plaintiff cannot recover his entire damages from that
given defendant, it would not necessarily do violence to the general tort
principle that the plaintiff should be restored to the position he would
have been in absent defendant's tortious conduct. That portion of the
damage not causally attributable to a given defendant would have been
suffered by the plaintiff regardless of that defendant's tortious conduct;
and, absent the conduct of the other defendants, that portion of the loss
would not have occurred despite the conduct of the given defendant.
Conversely, if the law holds each of several defendants-whose conduct is sufficient to account for some but not all of plaintiff's damages--liable for the entire injury, then an injustice is worked on a given
defendant: he is held liable for a portion of the damage for which his
conduct is neither a sufficient nor a necessary causal condition.
Nevertheless, some commentators and courts have suggested that
concurrent tortfeasors falling in this latter category should be held liable for the entire injury unless they can prove the portion of the injury
which is not attributable to their conduct.74 In effect, when apportionment of the damages is theoretically possible because a given defendant's conduct cannot account for all of the damage, some courts would
shift the burden from plaintiff to defendant to prove which portion of
the damages cannot be accounted for by reference to that defendant's
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970); Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Listle, 74 Cal. App.
2d 638, 650, 169 P.2d 462, 469 (1946).
74. See, e.g., I HARPER & JAMES, supra note 32, at 706-08.
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conduct.7" This certainly appears to be the trend in California, although it was not always the rule.
In the 1891 case of Miller v. HighlandsDitch Co.,76 several sources
of water merged and flowed onto plaintiff's property, depositing sand
and debris. The court held that procedurally all the parties contributing to the plaintiff's damage could not be joined in one action at law
for damages (procedural joint tort). The court recognized that its holding created a burden for plaintiff in terms of proving those damages
attributable to any one given defendant (substantive liability). Furthermore, the court indicated that even if procedural joinder were allowed, the judgment as to each defendant would have to be several,
based on each defendant's proportionalparticipation in the joint
damage.77
Forty years later, in Slater v. PacficAmerican Oil Co.,78 plaintiff's
property was damaged by oil, salt, and hydrocarbons carried by runoff
to plaintiff's land from the land of several defendants. The court cited
a prior appellate court case, CaliforniaOrange Co. v. Riverside Portland
Cement Co .,79 in which plaintiff's property was damaged by dust from
two separate sources. Consistent with the Miller case, the California
Orange Co. court held that plaintiff could recover an apportioned
amount of damage based on the quantity of dust contributed by the
defendant. The Slater court indicated that CaliforniaOrange Co. stood
for the proposition that where there is difficulty in determining the exact amount of damage attributable to each defendant, the burden is still
on the plaintiff to produce some evidence (albeit inexact) upon which
the court could exercise a liberal hand in arriving at a judgment. 80 The
Slater court held that to recover damages at law, it was not enough for
plaintiff to show that defendant participated causally in the injury. Although such proof would be sufficient to bring an action in equity for
injunctive relief, to recover damages, plaintiff also had to produce some
evidence upon which apportionment could be made.81 In Slater, the
plaintiff had produced no evidence of what portion of the total of oil,
75. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1974); Finnegan v.
Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 434, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950).
76. 87 Cal. 430, 25 P. 550 (1891).
77. Id. at 434, 25 P. at 552.
78. 212 Cal. 648, 300 P. 31 (1931).
79. 50 Cal. App. 522, 195 P. 694 (1920); see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the case.
80. 212 Cal. at 653, 300 P. at 33.
81. Id. at 654-55, 300 P. at 34.

LOYOLZA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
14

salt, and hydrocarbons deposited were defendant's. Consequently, the
court held that no money judgment could be given.
Ten years after the Slater decision, in City of Oakland v. Pacfc
Gas & Electric Co ,82 a party allowed steam to escape, damaging plaintiff's books. Sometime after the escape of the steam, defendant
breached its duty and allowed the escape of steam to continue. Defendant argued that since some of the damage to the books took place
prior to the breach of its duty, it should be held liable only for the
damage occasioned after its breach, and that it was incumbent upon
plaintiff to prove what portion of such damage was due to appellant's
breach ofduty. The court disagreed, holding that plaintiff had proven
that it was damaged by appellant's conduct and that, "[i]f the damages
proven could be reduced proportionately, that burden rested upon [defendant]. ' 3 In effect, the cburt concluded that, if defendant's tortious
conduct was implicated in proximately causing some, but not all, of
plaintiff's damages, the burden of proving what portion of those damages could not be attributed to defendant rested with defendant.
Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co.,84 citing City of Oakland, approved
this shift in the burdens associated with proving causation."5 These
cases did not reflect a judicial change in the substantive law of apportioning damages where possible; rather, they merely altered the burden
of proving causation so as to insure that negligent defendants would
86
not escape liability at the expense of an innocent and injured plaintiff.
82. 47 Cal. App. 2d 444, 118 P.2d 328 (1941).
83. Id. at 450, 118 P.2d at 331.
84. 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950).
85. In Finnegan, as in City of Oakland, plaintiff's damages were exacerbated by the defendant's subsequent conduct. The line of reasoning adopted by both those cases was also
favorably commented upon in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
86. Summers v. Tice illustrates an interesting shift in the concept of joint and several
liability. Before Summers, defendants were found jointly and severally liable for damage
only when their conduct had been found to be causally implicated in the injury. In City of
Oakland,the concept was used tofix causal liability. 47 Cal. App. 2d at 450, 118 P.2d at
331. In Summers, the plaintiff was blinded by a shotgun pellet. Two defendants negligently
fired their guns in the direction of plaintiff at the same time. Since only one pellet caused
the plaintiffs injury, only one defendant was both the necessary and sufficient cause of that
injury. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. The other defendant's conduct was
not causally implicated in the injury. Yet the court held both defendants liable. 33 Cal. 2d
at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. Thus, one defendant was held liable for damages he could not possibly
have caused.
The reasoning in Summers is an extension of City of Oakland and Finnegan v. Royal
Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32-33 (1950). In Finnegan, the court found
the defendant, who exacerbated an existing injury, jointly and severally liable for the entire
injury because of (1) the difficulty of apportioning the damages between the independent
tortfeasors and (2) a reluctance to permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer as against a wrong-
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As suggested earlier, apportionment when each of several defendants' conduct can account for some, but not all, of the damage (regardless of who has the burden of proving facts that would allow such
apportionment) might be explained by there being a portion of the
damage for which each defendant's conduct is neither a necessary nor
sufficient causal condition. The holding in the cases cited thus far
might be explained accordingly. The courts' willingness to apportion
does not always appear, however, to be predicated on this conceptual
touchstone. Rather, the courts appear prepared to apportion damages
when each defendant's conduct, apart from the other defendants' conduct, is a sufficient causal condition for plaintiff's injury and when each
defendant's conduct is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the
injury. The primary consideration that emerges from the decisions as a
guide to the courts' determination of whether apportionment will be
made is whether the conduct of the defendants is capable of quantification-that quantification serving as the basis for measuring or apportioning damages. Comparability in quantifiable terms is the decisive
factor.
In Grfith v. Kerrigan,87 plaintiff's fruit trees were damaged when
the water table rose above its normal level, soursapping the tree roots.
The amount of rise over the normal water table sufficient to cause the
damage resulted from three sources: one-half of the water was attributable to seepage from the canals owned by defendant Sutter Butte Canal Co.; one-third was attributable to seepage from defendant
Kerrigan's rice field; and one-sixth was attributable to other sources.
Sutter Butte Canal Co.'s demurrer was sustained without leave to
amend, and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff against defendant Kerrigan for one-third of plaintiffs total loss. The court recognized
that the seepage from Sutter Butte Canal Co., as well as the seepage
from Kerrigan's property, was a "but-for" cause of plaintiff's damdoer who might not be causally implicated in the entire injury. Thus, the judgment, as
against the exacerbating defendant, contained an amount attributable to his conduct and a
portion that was not attributable to his conduct. Any other judgment would have allowed
that defendant to escape all liability at the expense of the innocent plaintiff.
Summers merely took Finnegan one step further and applied its reasoning to a negligent
defendant who was not causally implicated in the injury at all. As to this one defendant, the
entire judgment reflected damages for injuries not caused by him. Any other result would
have allowed the defendant to escape all liability at the expense of the innocent plaintiff.
Thus, the court chose to favor the innocent plaintiff over the negligent defendant. However,
the theory that evolved from Summers, that the burden shifts to the negligent parties to
prove lack of causation, is a topic beyond the scope of this article.
87. 109 Cal. App. 2d 637, 241 P.2d 296 (1952).
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age, 8 making the conduct of each defendant a necessary but not sufficient cause of plaintiff's injury. Nevertheless, citing Caiffornia Orange
Co., the court upheld the apportionment of damages. 89 The similar
character of the defendants' conduct (runoff and seepage of water) and
the ability to quantify the amount of runoff apparently gave the court a
logical basis for deeming the injury divisible and apportioning the
damages suffered by plaintiff.90
Calfornia Orange Co. 91 involved a plaintiff who sought damages
for injuries to his orchard caused by cement dust from defendant's cement mill. During the period in question, 150 tons of cement dust per
year had settled on plaintiff's 168 acres: one-fourth of the dust had
come from the California-Portland Cement Co. and the remainder had
come from the cement plants of appellant, Riverside-Portland Cement
Co. The settling dust combined with dew and created an encrustation
on the leaves which could not be washed off. The encrustation seriously damaged the productive capacity of the trees. It is unclear
whether the 112 tons of cement dust attributable to Riverside-Portland
Cement Co. were sufficient to damage the trees; 92 however, some testimony suggested that the dust from appellant's plant may indeed have
been sufficient to account for the entire injury.93
88. Id. at 639, 241 P.2d at 298.
89. Id at 640, 241 P.2d at 299.
90. The court's decision does not satisfy the theory that a tort remedy should put plaintiff in the position he would have been in had he not been injured by defendant's wrongful
conduct. Here, had defendant's wrongful conduct not occurred, plaintiffs would have suffered no damage because that conduct was a necessary condition for the injury to occur.
Consequently, defendant Kerrigan should have been held for the entire injury. This criticism of the case does not turn on whether the injury was capable of division. Obviously, it
was divisible by reference to the relative amount of water that Kerrigan contributed to cause
the water table to rise to a level where it could damage the tree roots. Rather, the criticism is
based on the equitable nature of such an apportionment and its consistency with the underlying theory of tort recovery. In this case, the outcome is not justified. Defendant was required to pay only two-thirds of the damages even though, absent defendant's conduct,
plaintiff would have suffered no damage. See Alfonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Listle, 74 Cal. App.
2d 638, 650, 169 P.2d 462, 469 (1946); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
91. 50 Cal. App. 522, 195 P. 694 (1920).
92. The court did not address whether each cement company's dust was a cause of some
but not all the damage or whether the dust of each was sufficient to cause the entire damage.
That this issue was not raised in the opinion should indicate that the question of whether the
dust of both cement companies was a cause of some but not all of the damage or whether the
dust from each was sufficient to cause the entire damage was not significant to the court's
decision.
93. One witness testified that even a slight coating of the dust on the orange trees' leaves
would cause serious injury and that any discernable amount of cement dust, by its inevitable
interference with sunlight on the leaves, would cause appreciable damage to the trees. 50
Cal. App. at 527-28, 195 P. at 696.
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A fair reading of the case is not inconsistent with the conclusion
that appellant's 112 tons of cement dust falling on plaintiff's trees were
sufficient to cause the injury apart from the remaining forty tons from
the other cement plant.9 4 Nevertheless, the appellate court approved
and upheld the trial court's apportionment of damages between the two
cement companies. Again, the crucial consideration was not whether
defendant's conduct was a necessary or sufficient causal condition for
the entire injury, but whether the defendants' conduct was qualitatively
the same and capable of quantitative comparison-that quantitative
comparison being the 'yardstick" enabling the apportionment of
damages.95
Damages should not remain unapportioned merely because the injury can be characterized as "indivisible." It is clear that a tort injury
expressed in dollars and cents damages is divisible. The crucial question is whether or not there is anything in the character of several defendants' conduct which can serve as a logical, reasonable, or equitable
basis for dividing damages. In any division there is a numerator, a
denominator, and a quotient. The numerator is the plaintiff's injury
expressed in dollars and cents, capable of being divided. The quotient
is the apportioned damage attributable to any given defendant. What
makes the damage divisible or indivisible is the presence or lack of a
denominator which is logical, reasonable, or equitable and which
serves the policies of tort law.
When the California Supreme Court announced the comparative
negligence principle in Li it provided a quantitative numerator in the
form of a jury's finding of proportionate fault on the part of all parties.
In effect, the court indicated that if there is a claim against a given
party for injury there are two questions to be determined. The first is
whether that party's conduct was the proximate cause of the injury. If
a given party's conduct is a proximate cause of the injury, then that
injury vis-a-vis that party consists of two elements: (1) the culpable
portion of the damages as reflected by the party's proportionate fault,
and (2) the innocent damages -or that portion of the damages which
exceeds the party's proportionate fault. In other words, a given party
may be the cause of the entire injury (in the sense that the party's conduct is a necessary or sufficient causal condition of the injury), but that
injury may be made up of a culpable portion of damages as well as an
innocent portion of damages. If the culpable conduct of each of several
independent parties is a proximate cause of a given injury and if the
94. Id. at 529, 195 P. at 697.
95. Id. at 527-28, 195 P. at 696.
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proportionate fault of each is determined in quantitative terms, then
the damages are certainly capable of being apportioned or divided by
reference to that proportionate fault. The remaining question is
whether the guiding principles of Li-logic, practical experience, and
justice-are served by such a division. To resolve the issue merely by
characterizing the injury as "indivisible" gives the illusion that a tautology is an independent ground justifying no apportionment.
The bankruptcy of the "indivisible injury in spite of divisible
fault" argument becomes clear when the rationale underlying the all or
nothing contributory negligence defense, rejected in Li, is examined.
In his American Motorcycle dissent Justice Clark states that the argument proves too much, for if plaintiff's negligence is also a proximate
cause of the entire indivisible injury, then that argument, if meritorious, would warrant repudiation of Li not only in multiple-party cases
but in all cases.96 His criticism gains added force when one examines
the California rationale which supported the contributory negligence
doctrine; that rationale was explicated in Needham v. San Francisco&
San Jose Railroad.97 The Needham court indicated that the effect of
the "all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence was not based on
the proposition that the negligence of plaintiff justified or excused the
negligence of the defendant. Rather, the court found it difficult to hold
a negligent defendant liable where the conduct of both parties was a
proximate cause of the indivisible injury in the absence of a standard
for apportioning damages. 98 Therefore, a defendant who was "legally
and morally to blame" escaped the consequences of his actions because
the indivisible injury could not be made divisible.
In Li, the court wielded the Alexandrian sword of proportionate
fault and severed the knot that tied both plaintiff and defendant to the
entire injury proximately caused by both. Plaintiff and defendant both
may be the proximate cause of the entire injury (a necessary or sufficient causal condition for the injury) but, nevertheless, that injury may
be divided with respect to each party's liability according to his proportionate fault. Of course, divisibility of the injury by reference to the
proportionate fault of each of the parties does not necessarily require
several judgments against each defendant. That such divisions can be
made is not tantamount to proving that they ought to be made.
However, the court's very determination in Li is a repudiation of
the majority's argument that the injury is indivisible. The court in Li
96. 20 Cal. 3d at 611, 578 P.2d at 920, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 203 (Clark, J., dissenting).
97. 37 Cal. 409 (1869).
98. Id. at 419.
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in fact allowed division vis-a-vis a negligent plaintiff and negligent defendant and, in American Motorcycle, allowed apportionment among
joint tortfeasor defendants so that one who pays more than his proportionate share of a judgment may seek contribution. This fact suggests
that the court's actual position is that, while divisibility according to
fault is possible, such divisibility should not apply among negligent
plaintiffs and defendants when one of the defendants is insolvent. Such
a choice, if not arbitrary, must rest on some rationale of justice, practical experience, or logic which allows division for a negligent plaintiff
vis-a-vis the defendants and allows division among the defendants, but
does not allow such a division collectively among all negligent parties,
including plaintiff.
C. Requirement that Plaintiffbe Made Whole

The court's third rationale for fixing the entire risk of an insolvent
defendant totally on other defendants and not on a negligent plaintiff
rests on its perception that fairness dictates that a negligently injured
person receive adequate compensation for his injuries. 99
The majority cites Summers v. Ticelc0 in support of its reasoning.
However, the formulation of joint and several liability in California
and the rationale articulated in Summers presuppose that an innocent
injured plaintiff should be favored over a negligent defendant. 01 Jus99. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
100. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Reliance on the Summers decision for the proposition that fairness dictates a pragmatic policy of holding independent concurrent tortfeasors
jointly and severally liable in order that plaintiff not be precluded from his right of redress is
inappropriate. Summers does not even deal with concurrent tortfeasors. In Summers, one
of the defendants could not have caused the eye injury. Thus, the two defendants were not
independent concurrent tortfeasors. The problem addressed in Summers was the inequity
arising from the plaintiffs difficulty in causally tracing the eye injury to either of the two
negligent defendants. Absent proof of causation, the innocent plaintiff would be deprived of
any recovery and the one defendant who was the legal cause of the injury would escape any
liability. Summers insured that an innocent plaintiff would recover even at the expense of a
negligent defendant who was not the cause of the injury. See supra note 86. The court
determined that the equities favor the innocent plaintiff over the negligent defendant. However, the issues adressed by the Summers court were those of proof, not of execution of a
judgment when one or more of the joint judgment debtors are insolvent. In fact, with respect to the proof issue, one of the two Summers defendants theoretically could escape liability if he proved that the other actually caused the injury, and that would be the case even if
the other defendant were insolvent.
101. See supra notes 86 & 100; see also Thornton v. Luie, 209 Cal. App. 2d 542, 552, 26
Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 (1962) ("The 'equities' thus considered are those of the wrongdoers
among themselves and at all times are subject to the greater 'equity' existing in favor of the
innocent injured party... The rights of the innocent injured party always do, and always
should, remain paramount."); Wouldridge v. Zimmerman, 21 Cal. App. 3d 656, 659, 98 Cal.
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tice Clark, in his American Motorcycle dissent, suggests that the court's
rationale does not apply where the plaintiff, at least in the American
Motorcycle situation, is an alleged wrongdoer."12 Justice Clark's criticism is implicitly based on the supposition that joint and several liability is necessary to safeguard an injured but innocent plaintiff.
Let us return to our initial example of a $100,000 loss, with a 30%
negligent plaintiff, a solvent 10% negligent defendant, and an insolvent
60% negligent defendant. Even under the majority's ruling as to joint
and several liability, plaintiff can never be made entirely whole-he
cannot be restored to the position he was in prior to the tortious conduct. The damages initially suffered are $100,000. UnderLi, plaintiff's
damages must be discounted by $30,000 in accordance with his proportionate fault (his culpable damages), leaving him a maximum recovery
of only $70,000 (his innocent damages). If plaintiff is to be made whole
by way of a satisfied judgment for his innocent damages of $70,000, he
will be made whole at the expense of defendants. If both defendants
are solvent, it would be at the expense of $10,000 for one defendant and
$60,000 for the other defendant. This expense to each defendant
merely reflects each one's proportion of culpable damages. However,
in our example, the 60% negligent defendant was insolvent. Therefore,
plaintiff can only be made whole for his innocent damages at the expense of the solvent defendant who must pay $70,000, $10,000 of which
represents his culpable damages and $60,000 of which reflects innocent
damages as to him.
This analysis demonstrates that in order to make plaintiff whole,
the court must inflict an injury on the solvent defendant in excess of his
proportionate fault. It is equally clear that plaintiff's negligent conduct
is causally implicated in inflicting this injury on defendant.
It is essential to a proper understanding of the problem to go beyond the labels of "plaintiff" and "defendant" and to recognize that
culpable conduct on the part of several parties concurred to proximately cause a given injury, and that each party was a necessary causal
condition for the injury. The label "plaintiff" is affixed to that party
who must initially bear the cost of an injury. The label "defendant" is
affixed to the party to whom the plaintiff looks to shift a portion or all
of the loss. With respect to each of the parties, the entire loss that they
concur to bring about is made up of two elements: a portion of the
damage that reflects their share of fault or culpability (culpable damRptr. 778, 779 (1971) (quoting Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 542, 522, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393,
399 (1962)).
102. 20 Cal. 3d at 511, 578 P.2d at 921, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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ages), and a portion that reflects the fault of others and consequently is
faultless or innocent with respect to the given party (innocent
damages).
The plaintiff initially bears the entire loss-that portion which reflects his fault and that portion which constitutes plaintiff's innocent
damages and defendants' culpable damages. Under the majority's position, all of the plaintiff's innocent damages can be shifted to the solvent defendant in order to make plaintiff whole (at least to the extent of
his innocent damages). In shifting that loss, plaintiff's negligent conduct-through the intermediary of judicial action-inflicts injury upon
the solvent defendant, only a part of which reflects culpable damages of
that solvent defendant. At this juncture, the solvent defendant finds
himself in a position very similar to that of the plaintiff prior to satisfaction of the judgment-he has suffered a $70,000 loss (as opposed to
the $100,000 initially suffered by plaintiff) as a result of the concurrent
negligence of himself, the insolvent defendant and plaintiff. Of this
amount, $10,000 reflects his culpable damages, and $60,000 his innocent damages. At thispoint the solvent defendant'sposition is no different
than was theplaintiff's with respect to the need to make him whole as to
his innocent damages.10 3 Conceptually, the solvent defendant has been
forced to bear $60,000 worth of innocent damages for which plaintiff
was, in part, the legal cause, just as initially the plaintiff was required to
bear $70,000 worth of initial innocent damages for which the solvent
defendant was, in part, the legal cause.
The majority opinion presents no equitable or rational basis for
determining that a negligent plaintiff should be made entirely whole as
to his innocent damages at the expense of making a solvent defendant
suffer that portion of his innocent damages which constitutes the insolvent defendant's entire culpable damages. 10 4
103. See infra text accompanying note 137. Additionally, the 10% defendant must bear
all of Cs insolvency even though the trier of fact has judged the 10% defendant only onethird as negligent as plaintiff.
104. One might suggest that at least to the extent that plaintiffs damages reflect personal
injury, such a rationale can be supplied. Plaintiff loses an arm as a result of defendants'
negligence, which is translated into $100,000 of damages; plaintiff in one sense would never
be made whole even if he were to recover the entire $100,000 and not merely the $70,000.
The $100,000 would never replace the arm. That amount of money would, at best, be imperfect compensation for plaintiff. But, when a 10% negligent defendant must bear $60,000
worth of innocent damages in order to insure that plaintiff recovers $70,000, all that that
defendant has lost is money. This argument is not without a certain amount of emotional
appeal. It is worth noting that in one comparative negligence jurisdiction, Georgia, joint
and several liability is retained for personal injuries while it is not retained for injuries to
property, albeit the distinction was not a matter of conscious choice resulting from the kind
of analysis made in this footnote. See supra text accompanying note 52. The difficulty with
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It would appear that the "must make plaintiff whole" rationale of
the majority is predicated on the temporal sequence in which the parties suffer a given loss. This proposition is hardly calculated to appeal
to the midwives of the Li principle-logic, practical experience, and
basic fairness. Indeed, it restores to the evolving doctrine of comparative negligence the lottery element which the court was at pains to eliminate in LiP° s because whether a negligent party is labeled "defendant"
or "plaintiff' is, in many cases, determined by chance rather than by
equitable considerations regarding the culpability of the parties'
conduct.
D. Lack of Comparable CulpabilityBetween PlaintfandDefendant
In its remaining rationale, the majority does not resort to the temporal sequence in which the parties suffer loss; rather, it focuses on the
character of the parties' conduct and assumes that the conduct of the
plaintiff (who initially suffers loss) is less blameworthy than the negligent conduct of the defendants (those to whom the loss is shifted in
whole or in part)."w
This final rationale breaks down into two parts. First, the court
points out that while Li allows a negligent plaintiff to recover, it does
not follow that in all cases the negligent conduct of plaintiff will be
causally implicated in the loss. 107 Justice Clark finds no fault with this
rationale; he merely indicates that it is no basis for retaining joint and
several liability in those instances where plaintiff's conduct is so
implicated.' 08
this rationale in terms of the majority decision in American Motorcycle is that that decision
covers injuries other than personal injuries. Even if it were used to apply to personal injuries, the fact remains that an individual, under the law, can be compensated by money damages, and the money he receives from his judgment is in full compensation for the injury.
This is true despite the fact that, from the individual's point of view, a money award may not
be adequate compensation. Furthermore, given this rationale, it is difficult on an analytical
level to see why the judgment should be reduced by $30,000 in the first place. See infra text
accompanying note 118 for a discussion regarding lack of differentiation between personal
injuries and property damage.
105. 20 Cal. 3d at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
106. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1249, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 881 (1975). Interestingly, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 880
(1978); Southern Pac. Trans. Co. v. California, 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1981); and Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980), could be
read as requiring a 10% at fault, solvent defendant who is liable on the theory of strict
liability to bear the risk of an insolvent, 60% at fault defendant who is liable on the theory of
negligence even when the 30% at fault plaintiffs conduct is characterized as willful.
107. 20 Cal. 3d at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
108. Id. at 611, 578 P.2d at 921, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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The second portion of the rationale asserts that where plaintiff's

negligent conduct concurs with that of defendants' to cause a loss, the
retention of joint and several liability is justified because plaintiff's culpability is not equivalent in fault to that of the defendants. 109 From
that major premise, the court essentially argues that, within the fault

system, the more blameworthy character of a defendant's conduct justifies insulating a negligent plaintiff from the risk of an insolvent defend-

ant. This is done at the expense of leaving the remaining solvent
defendants exposed to that very same risk.
At the heart of the majority's premise is the notion that plaintiff's

conduct is self-directed while the defendant's is other-directed; or, in
the words of the court, "a plaintiff's negligence relates only to a failure

to use due care for his own protection, while a defendant's negligence
relates to the lack of due care for the safety of others."' 10 This charac-

terization of the relative culpability of risk-creating conduct of plaintiffs and defendants leads the court to state that "insofar as the
plaintiff's conduct creates only risk of self-injury, such conduct, unlike

that of a negligent defendant, is not tortious." 11' This "plaintiff only
hurts himself while defendant hurts others" distinction might have

some immediate appeal. It is true that an intuitive sense of fairness
suggests that conduct which is only self-directed is less "blameworthy"
than conduct that creates risks for others. Furthermore, the majority's
attempt to differentiate qualitatively between the negligent conduct of
plaintiff and defendant appears to find support in the Restatement and
in Dean Prosser's writings. Both define "negligent" conduct as that
which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, and "contribu-

tory negligence" as2 conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of
11
harm to the actor.

Seductive though it may be, the majority's definitional distinction
and justification for differential treatment between plaintiffs and de109. Id. at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 905-06, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. Justice Clark interprets
the majority's statement of the difference in quantitative terms. Id. at 612, 578 P.2d at 921,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Clark, J., dissenting). He assumes that the majority is indicating that
the percentage figure of fault attributable to plaintiff will be less than that attributable to
defendants. This does not seem to do justice to the majority position because the matter did
not reach the Supreme Court after trial on the merits and the court had no basis for knowing
what percentage figure would be assigned by the jury to each party's conduct. Rather, the
majority speaks of a qualitative difference expressly explicated in other cases. See Rossman
v. La Grega, 28 N.Y.2d 300, 308, 270 N.E.2d 313, 317, 321 N.Y.S.2d 588, 595 (1971).
110. 20 Cal. 3d at 589, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (emphasis added).
Il1. Id. at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 45, at § 463, comment (b), § 464, comment (f);
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 68, at 416-22.
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fendants is unsound. Within the context of the "all or nothing" rule of
contributory negligence, one might wink at an uncritical acceptance of
this argument, for the purpose was to obviate the harshness of the "all
or nothing" rule and to allow injured plaintiffs to reach the jury with
their claims for recovery." 3 With the advent of the Li decision, the
majority's justification, relying as it does upon this major premise, cannot hold up under analytic scrutiny.
The court confuses a general linguistic formulation that may describe an aspect of a concrete situation with an accurate description of
the totality of that situation; that is, the court mistakenly believes that if
the application of one definition (contributory negligence) can be accurately made to describe the conduct of an individual, it necessarily excludes the application of the other (negligence).
It is patently clear that negligent conduct by an individual may
result not only in a loss to himself but also in a loss to others. 114 Thus,
it would be appropriate to characterize such conduct as both "negligent" as well as "contributorily negligent"; the application of one characterization without the other would be incomplete as a description of
the totality of the risk-creating conduct of that individual. The following hypotheticals serve as illustrations of this point.
For example, assume that (1) Mr. .4, Mr. B, and Ms. C all arrive
in the middle of a three-way "Y" intersection at the same time, (2) all
three are negligently speeding, (3) all three attempt to avoid a collision
by veering in different directions, (4) as a result, Mr. B and Ms. C avoid
a collision but Mr. .4 smashes into Mr. D's parked car, (5) the only
damages that occur are to Mr. A's and Mr. D's automobiles, and
(6) Mr. B is solvent and Ms. C is not. In a suit by Mr. A (plaintiff)
against Mr. B and Ms. C (defendants), the court's decision would
shield Mr. 4 from the risk of Ms. C's insolvency by placing that risk
entirely on Mr. B. Why? The court's rationale is that there is a qualitative difference between the culpability of Mr. A's conduct (contributory negligence) and that of Mr. B and Ms. C (negligence). But, in
113. 13 Cal. 3d at 811-12, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863; Fleming, Contributory
Negligence, 62 YALE L. Rav. 690, 723-24 (1955). The Li majority suggests that in the harsh
"all or nothing" jurisdictions once the dual standard is applied to the character of plaintiffs
and defendant's conduct so that the case may reach the jury, then the jury in fact does
consider the plaintiffs negligent conduct, not as a bar to recovery, but as a basis for reducing
his recovery. 13 Cal. 3d at 811-12, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
114. See Lemos v. Eichel, 83 Cal. App. 3d 110, 147 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1978), decided shortly
after American Motorcycle, where the court applied joint and several liability to a plaintiff
whose comparative fault was causally implicated in an accident that also resulted in an
injury to some of the defendants.
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addition to being contributorily negligent, Mr. A was negligent; his
negligent conduct was causally implicated in Mr. D's loss and may
have created a risk of loss to Mr. B and Ms.. C, although those risks
were not realized. The qualitative differences in the culpability of Mr.
A' (plaintiff's) conduct and Mr. B' and Ms. C' (defendants') conduct, upon which the majority opinion relies in American Motorcycle,
can only be maintained by wearing linguistic blinders."'
The majority's distinction does not survive analysis even in cases
where the only one suffering a loss is the plaintiff. For example, assume (1) Ms. A negligently drives her heavy duty truck by going 45
miles an hour in a 20 mile an hour speed zone, (2) Mr. B is negligent in
that he is crossing the street against the red light, (3) Ms. A and Mr. B
arrive at the same intersection at approximately the same time, (4) if
Mr. B were not in the intersection no harm would have occurred despite Ms. A's speeding, and (5) if Ms. A were not speeding she could
have controlled her truck without any injury, albeit Mr. B was negligently in the intersection. Based upon these assumptions, two scenarios
could be written. Each would differ as to who is defendant and who is
plaintiff but would in no way alter the character of risks created by Ms.
A and Mr. B. Ms.A could fortuitously swerve, avoid striking Mr. B by
a fraction of an inch, but in the process wreck her truck. In that event,
she would be plaintiff and Mr. B, defendant; Ms. As conduct would be
contributory negligence and Mr. Bs'negligence. It is equally plausible
that Ms. 4, due to fortuitous circumstances could veer, but still not
miss Mr. B. Rather, she could strike him, severely injure him, but, due
to the heavy construction of her truck, suffer no initial loss. In that
event, Ms. A would be defendant and Mr. B, plaintiff; Ms. A's conduct
would be negligence and Mr. Bs'contributory negligence.
The point is that who will be plaintiff or defendant is not based on
the qualitative difference in the culpability of the parties' conduct (the
degree of risks created and the object of risks); rather, it is based on
fortuitous circumstances. Thus, to decide in a multiparty litigation to
shield parties labeled "plaintitf' from the risk of insolvency and to
place that risk on others labeled "defendants" is to reintroduce the lottery aspect of tort law which the Li court sought to eliminate by the
adoption of a pure comparative negligence system.116
The American Motorcycle majority blurred the difference between
characterizing conduct as negligence (contributory or otherwise) on the
115. The sterility of deciding these matters on a narrow linguistic basis was expressed in
the Daly case, see supra note 8.
116. 13 Cal. 3d at 827-28, 532 P.2d at 1242-43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
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basis of risks created as opposed to risks realized. The difference between Mr. X, who speeds through a residential zone and injures somebody and Ms. Y, who might speed through the same zone without
injuring anybody, is not that Mr. X is negligent and Ms. Y is not.
Rather, both are equally negligent in creating unreasonable risks to
others (as well as to themselves). The difference is that Mr. Xs negligence is actionable and Ms. Yv is not; that is, one of the risks created
by Mr. X actually materialized while none of the risks created by Ms. Y
did. Which, if any, of the unreasonable risks created by the negligent
conduct of a given party materializes may not be due to the character
of the conduct but due, rather, to fortuitous circumstances.
The extent to which fortuitous circumstances, rather than qualitative differences in culpability of conduct, determine who is plaintiff and
who is defendant might be illustrated by the following permutations
involving four individuals (.4, A, E and .)) who are traveling at the
same speed and who arrive in the middle of the same intersection at the
same time after each negligently runs a four-way stop sign. A is traveling in an armored car; A r on a moped; E in a borrowed and badly
dilapidated Edsel; and P in a rare, fully restored and expensive Duesenberg. Let us first assume that the Duesenberg, Edsel and Moped
were totally demolished; only M received personal injuries, and A and
his armored car came out unscathed. In any action among the four
parties, A, who was uninjured, would be a defendant and not a plaintiff; E, who suffered no personal injury and borrowed the Edsel, also
would only be a defendant; and both M and D would be plaintiffs (or
cross-complainants) and defendants (or cross-defendants), having both
suffered injury as well as having inflicted injury on others. If we play a
game of musical chairs and moveA into D's vehicle, D into E s, E into
M's, and A into A , then M and D become defendants only and A*
and E become plaintiffs (or cross-complainants) as well as defendants
(or cross-defendants). The reversal in the labels attached to the parties
does not occur because the qualitative character of their conduct
changes, but rather depends on the fortuitous circumstance of the type
of vehicle each happened to be driving.117
Now let us vary the facts so as to eliminate A and his moped from
the situation; to make the armored car company and its driver, A,
financially insolvent; to have the driver of the Edsel own a rare and
117. Obviously, the risks created by a moped running a stop sign may be less than those
created by the armored car. Those differences might support a quantitative difference in the
proportion of fault attributed by the jury toA and M, rather than the qualitative difference
suggested by the majority.
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expensive Pierce Arrow which on the day of the accident was being
serviced so that E was driving an Edsel loaner worth $2,000; and to
value both the Duesenberg and the Pierce Arrow at $100,000 each.

Thus, in our example, the total loss suffered because of the concurrent
negligence of the three parties is $102,000. Assume further that a jury
found each of the three drivers equally negligent. Because there is now

no source of recovery from the insolvent armored car company and its
driver, A, the only parties left to bear the loss are D and E. Clearly,
each contributed equally to the loss. Yet, under American Motorcycle,
D would have his loss reduced by one-third ($33,333.33) and could

recover the remaining two-thirds from E ($66,666.67). The owner of
the Edsel loaner could recover the $2,000 from either D or E. If one
assumes that D and E are equally responsible for the loss and pay the

owner of the Edsel $1,000 each, the total loss of $102,000 is borne
between D and E as follows: D, $34,33.33 or a little more than one-

third of the total loss; and E, $67,666.67 or a little less than two-thirds
of the total loss. This distribution of the loss would occur under the

majority's holding in spite of the fact that D and E were equally at
fault and their conduct indistinguishable except for the fortuitous circumstance of the value of the vehicles driven." 8
The lottery aspect of such a result becomes more apparent if we
assume that both D and E had their antique motor cars serviced at the
same garage and drove Edsel loaners. If, on the day of the accident,
the Duesenberg was being serviced instead of the Pierce Arrow so that

D instead of E was driving the Edsel loaner and E was driving the
Pierce Arrow, the total loss would be ufnaffected. The character of their
conduct also would be unchanged as would be the amount of fault

(one-third) attributed to both. The proportion of the damage borne by
118. The result is no different when personal injuries are incurred as well as property
damage. For instance, in our example, let us substitute M on his moped for E and his Edsel
loaner. Let us assume that the Duesenberg is totalled but that D receives no personal injuries and thatA and the armored car escape unharmed. Further assume that M, in trying to
avert the crash, is thrown from his moped and suffers personal injuries, the value of which a
jury fixes at $60,000; however, M's moped is not damaged. With 4 and the armored car
company insolvent, the resolution of how the $160,000 of total damages is to be borne
between D and M is the same as in the earlier examples in spite of the fact that $100,000
represents property damage and $60,000 represents personal injuries. See supra note 104.
D's $100,000 damages would be reduced by one-third ($33,333.33) and the remaining
amount would be recoverable from M (given the insolvency of A and the armored car company); M's $60,000 damages would be reduced by one-third ($20,000.00) and the remaining
two-thirds would be collectable from D ($40,000.00). E would bear $53,333.33 (or onethird) of the loss and M would bear $106,666.67 (or two-thirds). Thus, while the fault of E
relative to that of D is the same, E bears a greater portion of the total loss despite the fact
that L's loss consists of personal injuries and D's of property damage.
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each, however, would be reversed; just under two-thirds would be
borne by D and just over one-third by E. This dramatic reversal would
not result from a qualitative or quantitative change in the culpability of
the parties' conduct. Rather, it would result from the fortuitousness of
which party had his motor car serviced on that particular day.
While additional variations could be generated, those sketched out
above should dramatically illustrate the fact that, in most cases,
whether a negligent party will wear the label of plaintiff or defendant,
and thus bear the burden of insolvent defendants, turns on fortuitous
circumstances rather than the qualitative or quantitative difference in
the culpability of their conduct.
One might argue that, since in some instances the conduct of the
plaintiff might only injure plaintiff without raising unrealized risks of
injury to others, the attack launched in this article represents too wide a
net. Such an argument, however, also logically implies that the
supreme court's formulation ofjoint and several liability is too broad in
that it would catch in its net both plaintiffs whose negligent conduct
poses risks to others, as well as those plaintiffs whose negligent conduct
creates risks only to themselves. Furthermore, given the Li principle, if
the plaintiff's negligent conduct causes injury only to himself and if the
plaintiff is given recourse through the courts to have a negligent defendant share that loss, then it is not possible to argue that plaintiff
creates risks only to himself and not to others. Clearly, the negligent
defendant who must share the loss with a negligent plaintiff suffers the
risk of loss in tort due to plaintiff's negligent conduct. In creating the
risk of loss and insisting upon judicial redress from at fault defendants,
a negligent plaintiff's conduct does not operate in a restrictive area of
risk, that is, one which encompasses only risks to the plaintiff.
As the illustrations demonstrate, use of the labels "plaintiff" and
"defendant" to determine who in a multiparty litigation is to bear the
risk of an insolvent defendant is not dictated by the principles of logic,
practical experience, or fundamental justice. Once one goes below the
surface of the definition of "negligence" and "contributory negligence,"
one begins to fathom that there is no qualitative difference in the character of the negligent conduct of a party based on whether that party
was the "defendant" or "plaintiff." In Li, the court sought to bury the
lottery aspect of tort by the adoption of pure comparative negligence;1 19
in American Motorcycle the court resurrects that lottery aspect by mak119. 13 Cal. 3d at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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ing the label "defendant" or "plaintiff" the touchstone of who is to suffer the risk of the insolvent defendant.
VI.

THE LOWER COURT'S OPINION

The court of appeal opted for a solution diametrically opposed to
that formulated by the California Supreme Court. The lower court
held that the risk of the insolvent defendant must be borne by the
plaintiff.12 0 The court concluded that after Li there was no longer joint
and several liability; the judgments against each of the defendants
should represent a portion of the total loss-that portion to be determined by each defendant's proportionate fault.' 2 ' The court supported
its conclusion with three arguments: (a) its decision was more in keeping with the Li principle of liability in proportion with fault; (b) the
theoretical underpinnings of joint and several liability were eroded by
Li; and (c) the holding was fair because it placed the risk of the insovent defendant on the plaintiff rather than on the "social fund."
A.

Several Liabiliy as Consistent with the Li Princiole

The lower court, in its unanimous opinion, asserted without argument that several liability is more in keeping with the Li principle of
liability according to proportionate fault.' 22 On examination, this assertion holds true only if the problem is seen from the defendants' point
of view. If there is a $100,000 injury involving a 30% negligent plaintiff, a 10% negligent, solvent defendant, and a 60% negligent, insolvent
defendant, then from the 10% negligent defendant's viewpoint a judgment in the amount of $10,000 is in keeping with the Li principle.
However, from the perspective of the plaintiff who only recovers
$10,000 of his $70,000 of innocent damages, the lower court's decision
is contrary to the Li principle. The plaintiff would be forced to bear
90% of the loss even though his proportionate causal fault was only
30%.
120. In 1979, two bills were introduced in the California State Legislature that would
have, in essence, rejected the California Supreme Court's position and adopted that of the
appellate court. Those bills, S.B. 463 and A.B. 1784, provided that in an action for personal
injury, property damage, or death, when an indivisible injury is caused by two or more
persons, damages will be equitably apportioned among them by the trier of fact. Furthermore, each person would be liable "only for the percentage of the total compensable damages allocated to him and separate judgment shall be rendered against him for that
amount." S.B. 463 § 2 (1979); A.B. 1784 § 2 (1979). Both bills failed to pass.
121. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 503 (1977), vacated,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
122. Id.
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The lower court's decision arises, as does that of the supreme
court, from a failure to view the entire loss as separate from the particular label affixed to the parties ("defendant" or "plaintiff"). When the
entire loss is viewed in terms of all the parties whose fault is causally
implicated in the loss, the lower court's position is not in keeping with
Li. In the above example, the Li principle would dictate that the
$100,000 loss should be borne by all parties in proportion to their fault,
and if $60,000 is uncollectable from one of the defendants, then that
$60,000 should be borne by the plaintiff and the solvent defendant in a
ratio corresponding to their proportionate fault, that is, in the manner
outlined in Section VII of this article. That method would require both
A4 and B to share the $60,000 uncollectable from C on a 3 to 1 ratio (/
being 30% negligent and B being 10% negligent).
B. Basis of Joint and Several Liability Eliminatedby Li
The lower court argued that joint and several liability rested on
the assumptions that (1) the plaintiff was innocent, (2) the plaintiff's
damages were caused by a negligent defendant, (3) defendant's negligent conduct could not be apportioned, and (4) the legal system could
123
not consider proportionate negligence in allocating responsibility.
The court argued that these assumptions were shattered by Li.1 24 A
negligent plaintiff may recover damages, juries may determine proportionate fault, and the Li principle itself supports the proposition that
the proportion of fault must be considered in assessing damages. This
article agrees with the lower court that Li requires a revision of joint
and several liability; however, that revision does not necessarily require
the adoption of the lower court's "several liability."
The difficulty with the lower court's argument is that it goes too
far. It may discredit traditional notions of joint and several liability
(affirmed by the supreme court in American Motorcycle), but it does
not, thereby, necessarily support the "several liability" position
adopted by the lower court. Li did destroy the "all or nothing" principle of tort law whereby each party (negligent plaintiff along with negligent defendants) bore the full legal responsibility for damages apart
from the degree to which the other parties' negligent conduct concurred
in the loss. The principle that now allows a negligent plaintiff to recover might have destroyed the basis for arguing that in all cases the
risk of the insolvent defendant must be borne by solvent defendants
123. Id. at 501.
124. Id.
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and only by them (at least in those cases in which the plaintiff's conduct was causally implicated in the loss). However, it does not necessarily follow from that principle that in all cases the risk of the
insolvent defendant must be borne by the plaintiff regardless of
whether the plaintiff's conduct was negligent and, if negligent, regardless of the proportionate fault of plaintiff vis-a-vis that of the solvent
defendant.
In short, the lower court assumes that there are only two alternatives with regard to who is to bear the risk of the insolvent defendant:
(1) joint and several liability whereby solvent defendants bear the burden of the insolvent defendant to the exclusion of plaintiffs; and (2) the
lower court's notion of several liability whereby only plaintiffs bear
that burden. From this assumption the lower court establishes the second alternative by process of elimination. Essentially, the court argues
that since the first alternative is not in keeping with Li we are left with
the second. However, the second alternative vis-a-vis the Li principle
is merely the flip side of the first alternative. Both are equally out of
step with Li and discrediting one does not validate the other by process
of elimination. A third alternative, outlined in Section VII of this paper, not only would appear to be in keeping with Li but would seem to
be dictated by it.
C. Policy ConsiderationsRegarding Loss Shifting
The court's final argument deals with the effect of loss shifting on
the "social fund," although it never precisely defines that term. The
court argues that its position must be adopted because placing the burden of the insolvent defendant on the solvent defendants would be tantamount to placing an additional charge on the "social fund" which
also must be available to provide education, to enhance the quality of
opportunity for the disadvantaged, to lessen the burden of local property taxation, and1 to serve a multitude of other growing fiscal needs of
the government. 2
The argument made by the lower court may be summarized as
follows: First, loss shifting occurs from the plaintiff to someone else
(ostensibly defendants), and generally from that someone to still others
(taxpayers, consumers, or purchasers of insurance).126 This second
shifting occurs through intermediaries such as social security funds,
public aid, private insurance companies, workers' compensation funds
125. Id. at 502.
126. Id.
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12 7
and insured automobile liability.

Second, ifjoint and several liability is retained, ultimately the burden of the insolvent defendant would be shifted to taxpayers, consum-

ers, or purchasers of insurance, and would thereby constitute a charge
on the already strained "social fund." Such a charge would divert resources from serving the subsidiary ends of education, equality of op-

portunity for the disadvantaged, reduction of crime, and reduction of
property tax and the fiscal needs of government.

Third, impliedly, the court assumes that if its concept of several
liability is adopted, the burden of the insolvent defendant will be borne

by the plaintiff alone and will not constitute a charge on the "social
fund" and a diversion of funds from it.

Finally, plaintiff cannot complain that his recovery is limited only
to solvent defendants, for prior to Li he could recover nothing. Consequently, since Li put the negligent plaintiff in the position of being able
to recover where heretofore he could not, that plaintiff cannot complain
to the proportion of fault reprebecause his recovery would be limited
128
sented by the solvent defendants.
There are several pertinent observations to be made regarding this
argument. First, even if one assumes that joint and several liability will
increase the charge on the "social fund," it is not entirely clear that
such an increase would be significant. For example, there is some evi127. The court refers to Keeton and O'Connel, but actually it is citing Conard, Remarlcs,
CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE 90 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Conard].
128. As a subsidiary argument, the court, relying on Conard's statistical analysis, see
supra note 127, argues that the fixed costs of shifting losses to the public fund is between two
and three dollars for each dollar distributed to cover loss. The implication left is that each
dollar representing an insolvent defendant's share of the loss paid by the solvent defendant
will be a tax on the social fund with an additional surcharge of two or three dollars representing costs of administration.
Conard indicates, however, that for the various sources of socializing the costs of loss,
the administrative costs vary from 3% to 125% of every dollar paid, depending on the source
tapped-social security, workers' compensation, etc., rather than two or three dollars as the
lower court states. Beyond this inaccuracy, it is not clear that, for each additional dollar
paid from one of the social fund sources, there would be a commensurate increase in fixed
administrative costs on the two or three dollar basis or on a basis more in keeping with
Conard's figures of three cents to one dollar and twenty-five cents. That is, it is entirely
conceivable that the total administrative costs in absolute dollars would remain the same or
would rise very slightly in the face of additional amounts paid. Thus, if the total administrative dollars spent remains constant and the amount of dollars paid out increases, the ratio of
administrative costs to dollars paid would decrease. This article does not assert that that
would be the case; it merely points out that it is a possibility. What will in fact occur cannot
be determined from the content of the lower court's decision nor by its reliance on Conard.
It is the kind of question more appropriately addressed by the legislature with its resources
for general fact finding.
in
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dence that in jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence, insurance
premiums have not increased. 29 If one were to engage in the "armchair empiricism" of the lower court, one would anticipate that the
adoption of comparative negligence (and the elimination of the all or
nothing contributory negligence doctrine) would afford greater recovery by plaintiffs against defendants, and that to the extent that there
was such greater access by plaintiffs to defendants, the increased charge
on the social fund would be reflected by increased insurance premiums
to insureds.
Even if there were such an increase in the absolute amount of dollars charged on the "social fund," it is not entirely clear that, when
these dollars are spread among the "taxpayers, consumers, or purchasers of insurance," they will represent anything other than a minuscule
amount, or will in any way seriously impair the availability of the "social fund" for the purposes outlined by the court. 130 Further, even if
joint and several liability were such a drain on the "social fund" that
some of the other needs served by that fund remained unmet, it is not
clear that those unmet needs would be more socially desirable than
compensating plaintiffs for their innocent damages. Moreover, because
the court is not in the position to perform the complex weighing of
priorities among the large number of socially desirable outcomesmany of which are not before it, that judgment is better left to the
legislature.
Second, it does not necessarily follow that when defendants bear
the burden of insolvency, the costs will in all cases be shifted to the
"social fund," and that when that burden is placed on plaintiff such a
shift will not occur. In those instances where solvent defendants are
uninsured or are insured yet face judgments in excess of policy limits,
the defendant might be forced to bear the loss without shifting it to the
"social fund." To the extent that the defendant is unable to pass the
loss on to the "social fund," the lower court's rationale is not a basis for
determining whether the plaintiff or the solvent defendant is to bear the
burden of the insolvent defendant.
Third, in many instances, the plaintiff's inability to recover full
compensation for his innocent damages from the defendants may in
fact result in a burden on the "social fund." Two cases illustrate this
129. Todd, The ProspectforAutomobile InsuranceRate Changes Under ComparativeNegligence, 38 TEX. B.J. 1153 (1973). Todd's analysis indicates that one cannot merely focus on
trial outcome in analyzing insurance cost due to substantive law changes. For example, one
must also focus on the effect that such changes might have on the assertion of claims.
130. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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point. In the first case, assume a plaintiff who is injured in the scope of
his employment as a result of his own, and two defendants', concurrent
negligence. Assume further that the bulk of the fault is that of an insolvent defendant and the remaining defendant is uninsured for that particular risk but has funds available to make the plaintiff whole.
Plaintiff could collect workers' compensation, thereby shifting the loss
to one of the sources of the "social fund" as outlined by Conard. If
both defendants were solvent, the workers' compensation carrier would
have a separate action against the defendants or could recover in the
employee's action for the amount paid in the compensation award. 131
To the extent that the burden of the insolvent defendant is borne by the
solvent defendant, the "social fund" is in a position to be compensated
for that portion of plaintiff's loss paid by the compensation carrier. If
in fact the burden of the insolvent defendant is borne solely by the
plaintiff, then the opportunity for the compensation carrier to be reimbursed is reduced, thereby placing the burden on the "social fund."
In the second case, assume the same set of facts except that workers' compensation is unavailable. Under the lower court's decision, the
plaintiff would have to bear the burden of the insolvent defendant.
However, the nature of the injury may be such as to incapacitate the
plaintiff from gainful employment. If the plaintiff were allowed to recover the entire judgment (reduced by plaintiff's amount of fault) from
the solvent defendant, that award might provide for needed financial
support to the plaintiff. Absent access to the solvent defendant for the
satisfaction of the judgment, the plaintiff might have to resort to state
or federal aid programs for subsistence-a resort that would most directly be a charge on the "social fund."
131. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3852-3857 (West 1970); Burum v. State Ins. Fund, 30 Cal. 2d
575, 184 P.2d 505 (1947). The difficulty with the majority's position, which is predicated on
the status of the parties, is illustrated by suits that could be brought by the employer or his
carrier. Prior to Li, negligence on the part of the employer precluded him from prevailing in
an action against a third party whose negligence contributed to the injury of the employee.
See Tate v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 249, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548, 554 (1963). Under
Li, such an action by a negligent employer or his carrier is not precluded; the recovery is
merely reduced. Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 669-70, 151
Cal. Rptr. 399, 432-24 (1979); see also Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 829, 844-46, 587 P.2d 684, 693-94, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 897-98 (1978)
(employer entitled to credit for amount by which its compensation liability exceeds its degree of negligence). For example, assume that an employee collected a $100,000 workers'
compensation award due to an injury suffered at the hands of his 30% negligent employer, a
solvent 10% negligent third party, and an insolvent 60% negligent third party. When the
employer pursues his statutory action against the third parties, must the solvent third party
totally bear the insolvency of the other third party because he is a defendant and the employer a plaintiff?
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Thus, whatever the lower court means by shifting the loss to the
"social fund," the proposition cuts both ways: uncompensated innocent damages borne by the plaintiff might be shifted to the "social
fund" and a solvent defendant's liability for a fellow insolvent defendant's culpable damages might not be shifted.
Another weakness in the lower court's argument becomes apparent when the term "social fund" is critically examined. The court never
defines the term but, based on its reliance on Conard, the aggregate of
social security, public aid, private insurance companies, workers' compensation funds and insured automobile liability policies I32 would appear to constitute the "social fund."
All of these sources of funds may be considered part of the "social
fund" because they are required by statute for the benefit of members
of the public who suffer loss. While these statutory schemes mandate
the existence of a given source of funds, not all of these sources are
financed by the government. Consequently, the charge upon the "social fund" will not necessarily diminish the dollars available to government for the realization of the salutary objectives outlined by the lower
court.
For example, let us assume that a plaintiff is injured as a result of
the concurrent negligence of himself, his employer, and two other individuals. Part of his injury would be compensated through workers'
compensation, a statutorily mandated program maintained through
private insurance carriers or by an individual employer who is selfinsured for that purpose. Premiums paid to an insurance company by
the employer (or money paid out by a self-insured employer) would
account in part for employee-plaintiff's compensation. Theoretically,
this cost of compensating the employee is passed on to the consuming
public in increased prices for the employer's goods or services. To the
extent that prices of goods subject to the sales tax are increased, there
would be a concomitant increase in state revenue. Consequently, when
the workers' compensation program bears the burden of a loss there
may be an immediate drain on employers and insurance companies,
but there would not necessarily be a drain on the public funds. 33
132. Other governmental programs designed to alleviate the burden of innocent damages
suffered by victims of disaster, such as disaster relief loans at low interest rates, might also be
included.
133. If the increased rates are not passed on to the consumer of the employer's goods or
services, they may cut into profit margins, and to that extent may adversely affect revenues
from income tax or local business taxes; if the employer passes the costs on in increased
prices for goods, the revenue from sales taxes may actually increase. What would in fact
occur is beyond the scope of "arm chair" economics. What is suggested, however, is that the
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In this example, if the employer were self-insured and bankrupt
and the other two defendants were insolvent, then plaintiff would have
to absorb the cost of the injury. If the injury were such that it reduced
or eliminated plaintiff's capacity to earn a living, then he might need to
resort to public aid, which would constitute a drain on monies collected
by state revenues. If, however, one of the defendants were fully insured
and able to compensate plaintiff for all of his innocent damages, then
there would be no drain on state resources. Instead, the compensation
would be passed on to all of the insurance company's insureds in the
form of increased premiums.134 Other examples could be generated to
illustrate this proposition.'35
This article does not suggest that the lower court's decision will
necessarily increase the strain put on state or federal resources. It takes
no position on that issue. What in fact will or will not occur is too
complex a problem to be addressed within the confines of a given appellate court case and requires expertise beyond the ken of the ordinary
tort lawyer. Indeed, the long range economic consequences, not only in
terms of the availability of public funds, but also of the ripple effect
that either court's decision might have on the economy in general, involve a study requiring extensive data analyzed by economists. What is
suggested is that the argument by the lower court cannot carry the burden of overriding the Li principle, which dictates that losses should be
borne according to fault and not according to which label ("plaintifr'
or "defendant") a party might happen to wear.
Even if for the moment we were to accept the lower court's argulower court's "arm chair" economics regarding the potential burden on the social fund does
not hold up when subjected to an "arm chair" critique.
134. Again, one might argue that the increased premiums are a business expense reducing
the amount of income that could be taxed. On the other hand, if the insured can pass the
increase to the consumer, keeping profits intact, the increase in premiums would not affect
income tax revenues, but might increase sales tax revenues. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. For example, let us assume that in our example plaintiff is injured, that the relative
fault of his employer, himself and the fully insured defendant is 5% each and that the liability of the remaining defendant, who happens to be insolvent, is 85%. Furthermore, let us
assume that plaintiff is totally disabled and that the jury returns a $500,000 verdict. Under
the lower court's decision, granting that the employer was self-insured and bankrupt, the
total compensation which would be received by the plaintiff would be $25,000. It is not
difficult to anticipate that with severe injuries rendering plaintiff disabled he would need to
resort to some sort of public aid, thus causing a drain on federal or state resources. On the
other hand, assuming that the defendant was insured up to $500,000, if the burden of the
bankrupt employer and insolvent defendant were borne by the fully insured defendant, then
the drain would be on the resources of the insurance company, and passed on to its insureds,
and no drain would necessarily be made on the resources of the state.
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ment regarding a drain on the "social fund," there is no basis for saying
that the outlined social fund purposes are more worthy of those dollars
than the compensation of plaintiffs for innocent damages. On the contrary, the history of both statutory and decisional law in California
shows a deep commitment to the compensation of victims for innocent
damages even though that compensation may increase the cost of government or of doing business for the private sector. 136 The provision of
medicaid, the provision for uninsured motorists coverage, the requirement for unemployment compensation, the requirement for workers'
compensation, and the concept of strict liability for defective products,
are all established programs and doctrines. Their existence signifies
that there is a state commitment to a direction diametrically opposed to
that which the lower court would adopt.
VII.

THE SOLUTION

The thesis of this article is that all solvent parties whose culpable
conduct is causally implicated in an injury should bear the burden of
an insolvent defendant according to their relative proportionate fault.
The principle is more simply stated than implemented. The next two
sections develop a scheme for implementation of the position taken in
this article, yet is equally applicable if the doctrine of joint and several
liability as announced in American Motorcycle is retained. Under such
circumstances it could be used to determine the rights and liabilities of
the remaining defendants underAmerican Motorcycle's doctrine of partial equitable indemnity when one of the defendants is unable, in whole
or in part, to pay his culpable damages due to insolvency.
For example, let us assume an innocent plaintiff suffers a $100,000
loss at the hands of three defendants whose fault is found to be as follows: solvent defendant A, 30%; solvent defendant B, 10%; insolvent
defendant C, 60%. The respective liabilities among the defendants for
the $100,000 judgment would be: A $30,000; B $10,000; and C $60,000.
Furthermore, let us assume that plaintiff levies against A's bank account for the full amount of the judgment, $100,000. Two questions
arise under the court's doctrine of partial equitable indemnity:
(1) What are the specific rights ofA against B and C under the doctrine
136. The following statement from A.B. 550 § 1 (1979) is an apt recitation of that tendency in the California courts:
[V]irtually all Tort law involves decisions as to the extent to which loss of the
injured person will be shifted to someone else..
. . [l]n California, the announced
judicial policy has been to increasingly shift those losses to purchasers of insurance,
as well as to all California taxpayers and consumers, through the expansion of
available tort theories and recoverable damages.
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of partial equitable indemnity, and (2) What are the correlative liabilities of B and C to A? In practical terms, the sole question is whetherA
should be allowed to recover only $10,000 from B (the portion of the
judgment representing B's culpable damages)? IfA could recover only
$10,000 from B, thenA would be forced to bear the entire burden of
the insolvent defendant, C, while B would bear none of that risk, although both of them wear the identical label of "defendant." The inequity of the situation is obvious. It is equally possible that plaintiff could
have extracted full satisfaction of the judgment by levying against B's
bank account for the entire $100,000. In that instance, B could recover
only $30,000 fromA, and the entire burden of the insolvent defendant,
C, would fall on B. Who would carry the burden of C's insolvency
would turn on whether the plaintiff sought to execute against A or B,
hardly an equitable basis for determining who among solvent defendants must bear the burden of the insolvent defendant.
If, on the other hand, A, having satisfied the entire judgment, were
allowed to recover more than $10,000 from B, the question becomes
"how much more?" And, after having recovered that amount,
whatever it might be, then what should be the liabilities and rights ofA
and B against C should C become solvent? The generality and pervasiveness of these questions can be illustrated by three different situations which appear in Table I, all of which can be subsumed and
resolved with respect to mutual liabilities and rights using the scheme
to be outlined.
The first situation involves a jurisdiction which adopts the position
advocated in this article-one in which all culpable parties are required
to participate in the loss according to their proportionate fault. It assumes a 30% negligent plaintiff, A, who suffers a $100,000 injury at the
hands of a 10% negligent, solvent defendant, B, and a 60% negligent,
insolvent defendant, C.
The second situation involves a jurisdiction like California which
has: (1) adopted comparative fault, (2) retained joint and several liability unchanged, and (3) adopted partial equitable indemnity among defendants based upon proportionate fault. It assumes a 50% negligent
plaintiff who has suffered a $200,000 loss and received a judgment
against the following defendants: A, 15% negligent and solvent; B, 5%
negligent and solvent; and C, 30% negligent and insolvent. Plaintiff's
judgment is reduced by $100,000, to account for his proportion of fault.
Of the remaining $100,000, $30,000 represents A's culpable damages;
$10,000, B's culpable damages; and $60,000, C's culpable damages.
Plaintiff collects the entire judgment from A.
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TABLE I
Amount of
Loss
Situation I

$100,000

Relative
Fault

Amount
Suffered

Amount of
Culpable
Damages

'4

$100,000

$30,000

AB
10%

-0-

$10,000

AC
60%

-0-

$60,000
(insolvent)

Ir
50%

$100,000

$100,000

£4

$100,000

$30,000

AB
5%

-0-

$10,000

AC
30%

-0-

$60,000
(insolvent)

'I

-0-

-0-

A,4
30%

$100,000

$30,000

AB
10%

-0-

$10,000

AC
60%

-0-

$60,000
(insolvent)

30%
(All culpable
parties share
total loss proportionate to
fault)

Situation II

$200,000

(Californiatype partial
equitable
indemnity)

(.r collects
$100,000
from £4)

Situation III

$100,000

15%

0%
(hybrid)

(ir collects
$100,000
from A,4)
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The final situation could arise in a jurisdiction which adopts either
of the two positions set forth in the two previous situations. An innocent plaintiff suffers a $100,000 injury and receives a judgment against
the following: a 30% negligent, solvent defendant, A; a 10% negligent,
solvent defendant, B; and a 60% negligent, insolvent defendant, C.
Plaintiff collects the entire judgment from A.
In all three situations, A vis-a-vis B and C initially suffers a
$100,000 loss of which only $30,000 represents his culpable damages;
the remaining $70,000 suffered represents his innocent damages, the total of B's and C's culpable damages ($10,000 and $60,000 respectively).
The issues involved in all three situations are identical and can be answered by the same scheme. 137 In all cases, A initially pays his as well
as B's and C's culpable damages. The right of-A to recover the culpable damages of B and C suffered by him, the right of A against B (or
C) to be reimbursed forA!'s payment of C's (or B's) culpable damages,
and other similar problems all can be answered in the same manner for
all three situations. Thus, while the scheme presented here is developed as a handmaiden to a jurisdiction described in Situation I, it could
easily serve a jurisdiction which adopts the position announced in
American Motorcycle to the extent that a scheme is necessary to work
out the court's doctrine of partial equitable indemnity (Situations II
and III).
The scheme's controlling principle is that each party whose conduct is proximately implicated in causing an injury, including plaintiff,
shall bear the loss according to his proportionate fault; and, this sharing
shall include sharing the culpable damages of an insolvent party (to the
extent of that insolvency) by the solvent parties on the same basis of
proportionate fault. Each party's proportionate share will be determined on the basis of the relative proportionate fault of the remaining
parties. Thus, in Situation I, the three parties (30% at fault A, 10% at
fault B, and 60% at fault C), in addition to their culpable damages,
would be potentially liable for a proportionate share of the remaining
parties' culpable damages. 13 Each of the three parties has a minimum
liability as well as a maximum liability. Each party's minimum liability consists of his own culpable damages. In addition, each party has a
potential liability to bear the insolvency of each of the other parties.
This amount along with his culpable damages fixes his maximum liability. For example, assume that although A initially bears the entire
loss of $100,000, only $30,000 represents A's culpable damages. As137. See supra text accompanying note 103.
138. The relative liabilities of the parties is fully illustrated and explained in Appendix I.

19811

COMPAR 4 TI VE

4 ULT

sume that C is insolvent. Under those circumstances, B is first liable to
A in the amount of $10,000, that $10,000 representing B's culpable
damages initially suffered by A. In addition, A and B remain potentially liable for the culpable damages of C unpaid by C; their maximum potential liability for these damages is divided between them on a
3:1 ratio, or $45,000 for A and $15,000 for B. Thus, under these circumstances B's minimum liability is $10,000, and his maximum liability is $25,000.
When a given party has suffered innocent damages, he may look to
the other parties for reimbursement. As he receives that reimbursement, the liabilities and rights of the parties must be continually adjusted. The adjustment should be made in accordance with the
proportionate fault of the various parties. The principle may be illustrated by taking a simple case where 4 initially suffers the entire loss
and is unable to collect from C. Using our example of a $100,000 loss
withA 30% at fault, B 10% at fault and C 60% at fault, Table II illustrates five possible variations. In all five, 4 initially bears the entire
$100,000 loss and does not collect from C.
In the first variation, A collects nothing from either B or C.
Under these circumstances, B's potential liability to A is $25,000,
$10,000 of which represent B's culpable damages and $15,000, his innocent damages, or his share of C's culpable damages unpaid by C. Since
A and B's relative fault was 30% and 10%, they share C's culpable
damages unpaid by C on a 3:1 ratio, B bearing $15,000 of those damages and 4 $45,000. By the same token, Cs potential liability to A4 is
$66,666.67, $60,000 representing C's culpable damages and the remainder representing Cs share (on a ratio of 30%:60% or 1:2) of B's culpable damages unpaid by B;A's share of B's culpable damages unpaid by
B based on this same ratio would be $3,333.33.
In the second variation, A recovers $7,000 from B. In all such
cases, any monies paid by B to 4 should be applied first to satisfy B's
liability for his culpable damages, and only after it has been entirely
discharged should any monies be applied to reduce his liability toA for
C's culpable damages unpaid by C. In this variation, B's potential liability to A is $18,000, $3,000 of which represents B's unpaid culpable
damages suffered by A. The remaining $15,000 represents B's share of
C's culpable damages unpaid by C. The ratio in whichA and B must
bear Cs culpable damages unpaid by C is no different in variation 2
than in variation 1. Payment of the $7,000 by B to A, however, does
change Cs potential liability to A; that liability now consists of only
$62,000 as compared to $66,666.67 in variation 1. It is clear that Cs
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TABLE II
IfA initially suffers the entire $100,000 loss (either becauseA is the plaintiff orA is one
of three defendants and plaintiff executes for the full $100,000 against A), then the
liability of B and C to A when A collects nothing from C and collects from B:
1.

-0-

B's liability $25,000

$10,000 CD
$15,000 ID

/B's ratio of Cs
unpaid CD (A's
ratio $45,000)

Cs liability $66,666.67

2.

$7,000

B's liability $18,000

C's liability $62,000

3. $10,000

4. $18,000

B's liability $15,000

{ $60,000 CD
$ 6,666.67

r$ 3,000 CD

t$15,000 ID
f $60,000

CD
$ 2,000ID

-0- CD
[ $15,000 ID

C's liability $60,000

{ S-0-

B's liability $ 7,000

-0- CD
Jt$ 7,000
ID

$60,000 CD
ID

ID C's ratio of B's
unpaid CD (A's
ratio $3,333.33)
JB's ratio of C's CD

[(A's ratio $45,000)
Cs ratio of B's
unpaid CD (A's
xatio is $1,000)
rB's ratio of C's
unpaid CD (A's
$45,000)
ratio is

B's ratio of Cs
unpaid CD (A's
ratio is $45,000)

C's liability $52,000

$52,000 CD
C wD

5. $25,000

*$8,000 of C's CD
f owed A paid by B

[*Note: C would be liable to B for this $8,000; when added to the
$52,000 owed A it would equal C's total CD of $60,000.]
B's liability
-0$45,000 CD
[**$15,000 of Cs
CD owed.A paid
C's liability $45,000
-0- ID
by B
[**Note: C would be liable to B for this $15,000; when added to the
$45,000 owed A it would equal C's total CD of $60,000.]

"ID" = Innocent Damages
"CD" = Culpable Damages

liability for his culpable damages initially borne by A remains unchanged; however, in view of B's payment of $7,000, C's share of B's

unpaid culpable damages must change. The $3,000 of culpable dam-
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ages unpaid by B must be borne by A and C on the ratio of 1:2 (4
being 30% at fault and C, 60%). That is, A must bear $1,000, and C,
$2,000.
Variation 3 shows the relative liabilities when B has paid all of his
culpable damages but none of his share of C's culpable damages unpaid by C. Variation 4 shows the relative liabilities when B has paid
not only all of his own culpable damages but some of his share of C's
culpable damages unpaid by C. At this point, C also becomes indebted
to B.
In the final variation, 4, having initially suffered the entire
$100,000 loss, collects from B the maximum amount of B's liability to
A-$25,000. That liability reflects $10,000 of B's culpable damages
and his entire liability for C's culpable damages unpaid by C (i.e.,
$15,000 since the relative ratio of fault as between A and B for the
$60,000 is 3:1). As in the preceding variations, C's liability to A will be
reduced by the amount of his culpable damages paid to A by B (here
from $60,000 to $45,000). Thus, in addition to being liable to A for
$45,000, C now would be liable to reimburse B for the $15,000.
Suppose the heretofore insolvent C comes into possession of funds.
What would be the competing claims ofA and B with respect to those
funds? The Li principle and equity demand that all amounts collected
from C (whether collected byA or B) be so collected that, with respect
to the burden of C's insolvency, a ratio betweenA and B is maintained
which reflects the relative fault of these solvent parties. For example,
let us assume that in variation 4 after B pays A $8,000 of C's culpable
damages, C comes into possession of $8,000 which is then collected
either by.4 or by B. How should the $8,000 be distributed as between
A and B? Since C has paid $8,000, only $52,000 of his culpable damages unpaid by him remain. That $52,000 insolvency should be borne
by A and B according to their relative fault; that is, on a ratio of 3:1.
On that basis 4 should bear $39,000 of the $52,000 and B $13,000
(hereinafter "theoretical ratio" or "TR"). Prior to C's payment of
$8,000,-4 and B bore C's insolvency on a 13:2 ratio which expressed in
dollar amounts was $52,000 to $8,000 (hereinafter "actual ratio" or
"AR"). Therefore, the entire $8,000 collected from C should be distributed to A, thus altering the $52,000 to $8,000 actual ratio toward the
requisite $39,000 to $13,000 theoretical ratio. Such a distribution will
not achieve the requisite 3:1 ratio (or $39,000 to $13,000). The actual
ratio will now be 23:4 (or $46,000 to $8,000). However, any distribution other than allocating the entire $8,000 toA would tend to move the
actual ratio away from the 3:1 theoretical ratio.
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Assume the same facts as outlined in the prior paragraph except
that $32,000 instead of $8,000 is collected from C. In that event, C's
remaining culpable damages unpaid by C would be $28,000. Based on
the 3:1 ratio, A should bear $21,000 of the $28,000 and B $7,000. Immediately prior to collecting the $32,000, 4 bore $52,000 of C's culpable damages, and B bore $8,000. Consequently, $31,000 should be
distributed to A and $1,000 to B. Such a distribution achieves the 3:1
theoretical ratio. Once the theoretical ratio is achieved, all monies collected by-4 or by B from C should be distributed to 4 and B on the
basis of the 3:1 ratio.
Table II represents the simplest situation in which solvent parties
must bear the burden of an insolvent defendant. As the insolvent defendant becomes a source of satisfaction for judgments paid (or losses
suffered by the solvent parties), payment by that heretofore insolvent
defendant should materially alter the rights and liabilities of all the
parties. Those rights and liabilities ought to be continually adjusted
according to the limiting factor of the relative proportionate fault of the
parties, according to the theoretical ratio. In order to illustrate how the
principle would work, variation 5 is examined in the remaining portion
of this section. A hypothetical scenario of payments will illustrate how
changing rights and liabilitites theoretically would occur. Appendix II
presents similar scenarios for variations 2 through 4. The scenario
dealing with variation 5 is given in Table III.
In the first row of the Table, A has received $25,000 from B,
$10,000 of which are B's culpable damages and $15,000 of which
represent B's share of C's culpable damages unpaid by C. The theoretical ratio in which A and B should bear the burden of C's $60,000
unpaid culpable damages is $45,000 to $15,000. Column 5 indicates
that the actual ratio in which A and B bear the burden of C's insolvency is identical to the theoretical ratio; therefore, B no longer has any
liability to A resulting from the need to bring the actual ratio in accordance with the theoretical ratio. In spite of the fact that C has paid none
of his culpable damages, his obligation to A is only $45,000, since
$15,000 of C's culpable damages initially borne byA4 were paid to.4 by
B. However, by virtue of B's payment toA4 of $15,000 of C's culpable
damages (innocent damages as to B), C incurs a liability of $15,000 to
B (Col. 13).
In the second step of the scenario (Row 2), A collects $16,000 from
c in addition to the $25,000 already collected from B. Of the' total of
$41,000 collected by A from B and C, $10,000 represents B's culpable
damages and $31,000 C's culpable damages. The payment of $16,000
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reduces C's culpable damages unpaid by C from $60,000 to $44,000.
Based on the 3:1 ratio of A to B's fault, that $44,000 should be borne
$33,000 byA and $11,000 by B (Row 2, Col. 4). However, the $44,000
of C's culpable damages unpaid by C and borne by.A has been reduced
by the $16,000 to $29,000. As a result, the actual ratio in which A and
B bear C's culpable damages unpaid by C is $29,000 to $15,000 (Row
1, Col. 5). Thus, to restore the actual ratio to the theoretical ratio, A
should payB $4,000; or, the $16,000 collected byA should be viewed as
consisting of a portion ($4,000) collected by A on behalf of and paid
over to B. The results of the transaction prior toA paying B the $4,000
appear in Row 2; Row 2a reflects the adjustments which would occur
afterA pays B the $4,000. As a result of the first part of the transaction,
C has paidA $16,000 (Row 2, Col. 8) and only $29,000 of the culpable
damages are owed by C to A (Row 2, Col. 9); this is because A has
received $31,000 of C's culpable damages, $16,000 having been paid by
C and $15,000 by B. As a result of the second part of the transaction,
A has paid toB $4,000 of the $16,000 collected byA, thus reducing C's
liability to B to $11,000 and increasing the amount owed by C to A
from $29,000 to $33,000 (Row 2a, Cols. 13 and 9).
To recapitulate, C, initially having paid A $16,000, only owed A
an additional $29,000 of his (C's) culpable damages. However, of the
$16,000 (which reduces C's liability to A to $29,000), A paid $4,000 to
B (Row 2, Col. 6). This should reduce C's liability to B from $15,000
to $11,000 (Rows 2 and 2a, Col. 13). Therefore, in spite of the fact that
C owed A only $45,000 and paid $16,000 (reducing the amount owed
to $29,000), C's liability to A at the end of the entire transaction would
be $33,000 as a result of the $4,000 paid by.A toB in order to bring the
actual ratio into compliance with the theoretical ratio (Row 2a, Col. 9).
At this juncture, $44,000 of C's culpable damages remain unpaid
by C and should be paid by him on the basis of $33,000 to A and
$11,000 to B. Assume at this point that B collects $4,000 from C (Row
3, Col. 1), reducing the amount of C's culpable damages unpaid by C
to $40,000-C having paid A $16,000 and having paid B $4,000. On a
3:1 ratio (A's fault to B's fault), that amount of C's culpable damages
unpaid by C should be borne by A and B on a ratio of $30,000 to
$10,000 (Row 3, Col. 4).
At the outset of this last transaction, C's insolvency was borne by
A and B on the ratio of $33,000 to $11,000 (3:1). So at the point B
collected the $4,000 from C the ratio in which C's insolvency is borne
by A and B changes to $33,000 and $7,000, respectively; that is, the
$4,000 reduced the ratio from 33:11 to 33:7 (Rows 2a and 3, Col. 5).
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Also this $4,000 reduced C's liability to B from $11,000 to $7,000
(Rows 2a and 3, Col. 13). Consequently, in order to bring the actual
ratio in whichA andB will bear C's insolvency in line with the theoretical ratio, $3,000 of the $4,000 collected by B should have been collected by B on behalf of and paid over to A (Row 3, Col. 6). Once
$3,000 of the $4,000 collected by B from C is paid over to A (Row 3a),
the actual ratio in which A and B bear C's insolvency changes from
33:7 to 30:10 (Rows 3 and 3a, Col. 5). By the same token, C's liability
to B must change to reflect B's payment of the $3,000 to A; C's liability
to B changes from $7,000 to $10,000 (Rows 3 and 3a, Col. 13); and, C's
liability to A changes from $33,000 to $30,000 (Rows 3 and 3a, Col. 9).
At this point, the amount of culpable damages unpaid by C is
$40,000. That sum is borne byA and B on a ratio of 3:1 (4 has borne
$30,000 and B has borne $10,000, Row 3a, Col. 5). Since the actual
ratio in which A and B bear C's insolvency at this point is identical
with the theoretical ratio, every dollar collected from C representing
Cs culpable damages, whether collected byA! orB, should be collected
on behalf of A and B on a 3:1 ratio.
Indeed, in Row 1, the actual ratio in whichA andB bore C's insolvency was identical to the theoretical ratio. What happened in terms of
the adjustments required in Rows 2 and 3 (and reflected in Rows 2a
and 3a) merely reflected the fact that the amounts collected from C by
A (Row 2) or B (Row 3) were collected by them on behalf of both on a
3:1 ratio.
VIII.

IMPLEMENTATION

The hypothetical scenarios of the prior section and in Appendix II
are intended as a theoretical illumination of how the principle of partial equitable indemnity 139 should operate when one of the parties is
insolvent. In practice, however, rigid adherence to the sequence of
transactions of those scenarios raises many unresolved questions.
For example, 4 in the first transaction illustrated in Table III collected $25,000 from B-$15,000 of which was innocent damages as to
B and represented his share of C's insolvency. That in turn altered C's
liabilities to B and A. It also extinguished any potential liability C
might have had to A for B's unpaid culpable damages. 14 It also
reduced C's culpable damages ($60,000) payable to 4 by $15,000 and
139. For the purposes of this article, the principle has general applicability and encompasses those situations in which plaintiffs fault is causally implicated in the injury.
140. Compare variations 1 and 5 in Table II.
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created an obligation on the part of C to pay that $15,000 to B. 14 1
Should A have to make a showing of an inability to collect culpable
damages from C before he can collect the $15,000 from B? While C is
not part of the first transaction, it dramatically alters his liabilities; how
is C to receive notice of this change? When B is able to collect from C,
andA is not a party to that transaction, how is the effect of the transaction to be brought home to A? Under the scheme outlined in the prior
section, this is particularly crucial when the funds collected by B from
C should be collected on behalf of and paid to A. If in fact the money
is paid over by B to A this alters all the parties' liability.142 How are

the changes to be brought home to C? So long as a mechanism is available to insure correct disbursal, if B (or A) were to locate assets of C
which would satisfy C's entire obligation for his culpable damages, B
(or A) should be able to collect that entire amount regardless of what
C's specific obligation is to him.
What follows is a proposal for the implementation of the prior section's scheme which would obviate the problems just suggested. It is
capable of legislative implementation. Since partial equitable indemnity is an equitable doctrine created by the court, 143 the court also
could fashion enforceable orders which would implement the proposal
made herein. Indeed, the proposal is discussed from the point of view
of judicial implementation.' 4
Whenever a claim is made by one party that he has borne a disproportionate amount of loss, the court could fix the other parties' liability. If there were two remaining parties the court would fix for each
one of them that portion which represented the culpable damages of
each party, as well as the potential liability of each party for the other's
unpaid culpable damages. By example, let us return to our now familiar example of the 30% at fault A, the 10% at fault B, and the 60% at
fault C, with a $100,000 loss. Given an initial loss of $100,000 by any
one party, we could specify the 4liability of the two remaining parties.
That data appears in Table IV.1 1

141. See Table III, columns 9 and 13 of Row 1.

142. Compare Cols. 6, 9 and 13 of Row 3 with those columns in Row 3a.
143. 20 Cal. 3d 573 at 591-98, 578 P.2d at 907-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190-95.
144. The correct implementation is by way of an order. Money collection procedures in
California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 681-724 are provided for judgment creditors. However, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1007 provides that an order for the payment of
money may be enforced by execution, the same as judgments. Under that section parties to
an order should have the same remedies as a judgment creditor.
145. Note that the total of the remaining parties' liability exceeds the amount of innocent
damages borne by the party that initially paid the $100,000. In fact, when B initially pays
the entire $100,000, the liability ofA/ and C adds up to more than $100,000. This is because
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By reference to this Table, if A initially bore the $100,000 loss, the
court's order would indicate that B's total liability would be $25,000
made up of $10,000 in culpable damages and $15,000 in innocent damages; C's total liability would be $66,666.67 made up of $60,000 in culpable damages and $6,666.67 in innocent damages. If B initially bore
the $100,000 loss, A's liability would be $75,000 and C's $85,714.29.
Finally, if C initially bore the $100,000 loss, A's liability would be
$33,333.33, and B's liability would be $14,285.71.
The order would fix liability as an obligation owed to all parties as
a group rather than to a given party as was implied in the examples
developed in the prior section. Thus, any one party could initiate collection from any other equal to that other party's total obligation rather
than being limited by that party's liability to the collecting party. Furthermore, the order would provide that funds collected in discharge of
each party's liability be paid into court and then disbursed within the
conceptual framework outlined in the previous section. In other words,
the monies collected would be treated in a manner similar to the way
tenancy in common property would be treated if it were sold in a partition action. In that case, the proceeds would be disbursed in accordance with the proportion of each party's undivided interest. In this
case, however, the monies disbursed would be used to defray the innocent damages borne by any given party and to insure that solvent parties bore an insolvent party's culpable damages according to the
limiting factor of the relative ratio of proportionate fault of those solvent parties (TR).
Each party initiating collection of funds would be required to prepare a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment which would indicate how the
sums paid into court should be disbursed and how that disbursement
should alter the liability of the parties. The court order would require
that copies of such Partial Satisfaction of Judgments be served on all
parties and be executed by them unless a party made timely objections "4' 6 by a Notice of Motion for Hearing. In absence of such a timely
a portion of the damages are counted twice. For example, when B pays $100,000, A's liability of $75,000 is made up of his and Cs culpable damages; furthermore, $25,714.29 of A's
$30,000 of culpable damages again shows up as part of C's liability (his liability for A's
potential insolvency), albeit that figure represents innocent damages to C. In short,
$25,714.29 gets counted twice: once as a portion ofA's culpable damages and second, as C's
share of A's culpable damages unpaid by A. By the same token, $45,000 also gets counted
twice: once as a portion of C's culpable damages, and second, as A's share of C's culpable
damages unpaid by C. In point of fact, an amount in excess of $100,000 would not be paid
to B since each time A (or B) paid his share of the culpable damages, B's (or A's) liability
for A's (or B's) unpaid culpable damages would correspondingly decrease.
146. A particular time period, such as 15 days, should be specified.
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TABLE IV
Remaining Party's Liability

4

"

A

B

C

-0-

$25,000

$66,666.67

$3,333.33 ID
(4's share of B's
insolvency)
$45,000 ID
(,4's share of C's
insolvency)

1) $10,000 CD

1) $60,000 CD

2)

2)

$15,000 ID
(B's share of
C's insolvency)

$6,666.67 ID
(C's share of
B's insolvency)

0D

s
A
4(B's
W B

$85,714.29

-0-

$75,000
1) $30,000 CD

$4,285.71 ID
share of A's
insolvency)

1) $60,000 CD

2) $45,000 ID
(4's share of Cs
insolvency)

$15,000 ID
(B's share of C's
insolvency)

2)

$14,285.71

$33,333.33

1) $30,000 CD
2)

$3,333.33 ID
(4's share of
B's insolvency)

"ID"
"CD"

=
=

1) $10,000 CD

2)

$4,285.71 ID
(B's share of
A's insolvency)

$25,714.29 ID
(C's share of
A's insolvency)

-0$25,714.29 ID
(C's share of.A's
insolvency)
$6,666.67 ID
(C's share of B's
insolvency)

Innocent Damages
Culpable Damages

motion, the clerk of the court would disburse the funds according to the
Partial Satisfaction of Judgment signed by all parties. Signatures on
that Partial Satisfaction of Judgment would also constitute a stipulation
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by the parties as to the remaining liabilities. In this way such transactions as the two separate steps illustrated in Rows 2 and 2a of Table III
could be collapsed into one step.
A final question remains: must a collecting party make a showing
that he attempted and was unable to collect culpable damages from an
"insolvent" party before initiating a collection of innocent damages
from a "solvent" party? If in fact such a showing were required, it
would surely complicate the administrative procedures necessary to implement the proposal outlined in the previous section. It would appear
preferable to allow any of the parties to initiate collection against any
other party up to the maximum liability of that other party without
such a showing. For example, afterA initially pays $100,000 he should
be able to initiate collection of $25,000 from B without making a showing that he is unable to collect any of the $60,000 from C. Under such
circumstances, A would be motivated to locate assets of C, sinceA stil
remains uncompensated for $45,000 uncollected from C. Consequently, A's motivation to be fully compensated could insure good
faith in trying to locate C's assets. Furthermore, once those assets are
located by A, collection is made through the courts. Consequently,
those assets would be disbursed for the benefit of both A and B.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The solution outlined in section VII and the implementation plan
set out in section VIII would insure that losses are borne by all parties
in proportion to their fault, including losses due to the insolvency of
one of the parties. At the same time these proposals would minimize
the amount of administrative inconvenience necessary to insure such a
distribution of loss. They would insure that the parties legally at fault
for a given loss would share that loss in accordance with the Li principle and consistent with the dictates of logic, practical experience, and
fundamental justice.
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APPENDIX I
The relative liabilities of each of the parties with respect to their
culpable damages and that portion of their innocent damages which
represents their potential liability for the insolvency of any other party
is illustrated in the following Table, broken into Charts A, B, and C.
Chart A shows the situation using A's damages as the point of
departure. A's culpable damages are $30,000. If for some reason A
were insolvent, that $30,000 would represent innocent damages vis-avis B and C. However, B and C would be liable for part of.,'s culpable damages based on their relative fault. Because B is 10% and C is
60% at fault, the ratio in which they would have to bear A's unpaid
culpable damages would be 1:6 or, translated into dollars and cents, B
would have to pay $4,285.71 of A's unpaid culpable damages and C,
$25,714.29. IfA in fact bore or paid his $30,000 culpable damages, the
remaining amount of the loss ($70,000) would be innocent damages visa-vis A; that amount would be made up of $10,000 of B's culpable
damages and $60,000 of C's culpable damages. Should either B or C
be totally insolvent, the culpable damages of each would be borne by
the remaining parties in proportion to their fault. Thus, if B were insolvent, his $10,000 of culpable damages would be borne between 4
and C in proportion to their fault, or on a 1:2 ratio. As Chart A illustrates, that would translate into absolute figures of $3,333.33 forA and
$6,666.67 for C. The liability of both A and C for this amount represents innocent damages as to them. By the same token, if C were insolvent, 4 and B would have to bear C's unpaid culpable damages on a
3:1 ratio and, as Chart A indicates, that breaks down into $45,000 byA
and $15,000 by B.
Chart B is merely an arrangement of the information contained in
Chart A by beginning with B's damages; Chart C contains the same
information shown in Charts A and B but arranges it by beginning with
C's damages.
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$100,000 loss; A 30% negligent; B 10% negligent; C 60% negligent;
"ID" = Innocent Damages; "CD" = Culpable Damages
CHART A (Damages from A's position)
A:

$30,000 CD

B $ 4,285.71 ID
C $25,714.29 IDJ

$70,000 ID

B $10,000.00 CD

[A $ 3,333.33 ID

C$60,000.00 CD

C $ 6,666.67 ID
A $45,000.00 ID
B $15,000.00 ID

1:6 ratio
(10%:60%)
1:2 ratio
(30%:60%)
3:1 ratio
(30%:60%)

CHART B (Damages from B's position)
B: $10,000 CD
$90,000 ID

1

-A $ 3,333.33 ID
$ 6,666.67 ID
A $30,000.00 CD

C $60,000.00 CD

C: $60,000 CD

1:2 ratio
(30%:60%)

fB

$ 4,285.71 ID
C $25,714.29 ID

1:6 ratio
(10%:60%)

A $45,000.00 ID

3:1 ratio

B $15,000.00 ID

(30%:60%)

CHART C (Damages from C's position)
fA $45,000.00 ID

1,3:1

$40,000 ID

A $30,000.00 CD
$10,000.00 CD

ratio
(30%:10%)

fB $15,000.00 ID
B $ 4,285.71 ID
C $25,714.29 ID

1:6 ratio
(10%:60%)

A $ 3,333.33 ID,
C $ 6,666.67 IDJ

1:3 ratio
(10%:30%)
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APPENDIX II
The following tables start with situations 2 through 4 illustrated in
Table II in Section VII of the text. Each illustrates the changing liabilities among A, B, and C as varying amounts are collected. In all, the
object in the disbursal of these funds is to bring the actual ratio in line
with the theoretical ratio.
The first column of the tables indicates the amounts collected by
the party identified as collecting. The letters in brackets indicate the
party from whom monies are collected and the number preceding the
brackets represents, in thousands, the amount collected. The sequence
of collections in column 1 of each row recapitulates the prior transactions as well as indicating the transaction which occurs in that row.
Column 1, by the use of "CD" and the letters in parentheses, shows the
amount of each party's culpable damages paid through the transaction
illustrated.
"CD" means culpable damages; "ID" means innocent damages;
"TR" means the theoretical ratio of CD unpaid by a given party borne
by the remaining parties; and, "AR" means the actual ratio of CD unpaid by a given party borne by the remaining parties.
In all the tables B and C's maximum liability is as follows:

r$10,000
CD

B = $25,000

L$15,000 ID
$60,000 CD

C = $66,666.67

L $6,666.67 ID
In Tables 3A and 4A Row 3 involves a transaction whereby one
party (4 or B) collects monies from C and the collection is on behalf of
the remaining party (B or A). Row 3a of the tables reflects the adjustments which occur once the money is paid to the party on whose behalf
it is collected.
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